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The  next  generation broadband infrastructure  will  provide  access to 
two categories of content, applications and services – those delivered 
over the Internet and those provided on the managed networks of the 
infrastructure.  This paper addresses the question of whether operators 
of  broadband  infrastructures  have  the  incentives  to  engage  in 
discriminatory  practices  in  the  provision  of  access  to  content, 
applications and services on the Internet and the managed networks 
and what should be the appropriate regulatory response to address such 
practices.  In particular, the paper will examine the issues from the 
perspectives  of  the  Hong  Kong  environment  where  facilities-based 
competition has materialised and the end-users have wider choice of 
broadband  access  services  than  in  countries  where  monopoly  or 
significant market power still exists in the supply of access services.   
 
On the basis of theoretical considerations and empirical evidence from 
the market, this paper examines four questions.  First, in the highly 
competitive market in Hong Kong, would there still be incentives for 
access providers to engage in discriminatory practices against content, 
applications and services on the Internet and on the managed networks?  
Second, would such discriminatory practices lead to “market failures”?  
Third,  are  the  existing  laws  able  to  cope  with  the  discriminatory 
practices if they should lead to “market failures” that justify regulatory 
intervention?  Fourth, should new regulation be introduced to tackle 
the discriminatory practices? 
 
This paper argues that in the competitive environment of Hong Kong, 
incentives for access providers to engage in discriminatory practices 
may still exist, particularly in the provision of carriage services over 
the  managed  networks.    So  long  as  the  Internet  remains  open  as  a 
communications  infrastructure,  discriminatory  practices  over  the 
managed networks should not cause concerns from the public interest 
perspectives.    However,  in  the  future,  the  best-effort  Internet  may 
become inadequate as a communications infrastructure for all types of 
content, applications and services.  Discriminatory practices over the 
managed  networks  would  obstruct  the  achievement  of  the  public 
interest goal of having an open communications infrastructure to serve 
the society.  The existing telecommunications and competition laws are 
not entirely effective to tackle discriminatory practices against content, 
applications  and  services  on  both  the  Internet  and  the  managed 
networks that are found to be contrary to public interests.  However, as 
the future developments of the Internet and the managed networks are 
far from clear, it is premature to introduce new regulation to tackle the 
discriminatory practices.  At this stage, the recommendable approach 
for the regulator is to adopt proportionate measures to keep the best-
effort  Internet  open  and  maintain  competition  between  the  content, 
applications and services provided on the Internet and those on the 








Development of the next generation broadband infrastructure, with much increased 
speeds  and  capacity  to  meet  future  demands,  has  become  a  key  element  of  the 
information communications technology (ICT) policies of developed countries.
1 End-
users  connected  to  the  broadband  infrastructure  are  capable  of  accessing  two 
categories  of  content,  applications  and  services  –  first,  those  delivered  over  the 
Internet and second, those provided on the managed networks of the infrastructure
2, 
sometimes referred to as “managed” or “specialized” services.
3   
 
The Internet is a globally interconnected network of networks.  The characteristics of 
the Internet are its “openness” and “end-to-end” design.  “Openness” means that any 
provider of content, applications and services may launch its products on the Internet 
and be able to reach the global mass of Internet users without seeking permission 
from, or entering into agreements with, the operators of the access networks which 
connect  the  users  to  the  Internet.    “End-to-end”  design  is  an  attribute  to  achieve 
“openness”, because the intelligence for the operation of content, applications and 
services resides at the edge of the Internet within the control of the providers of those 
products while the Internet has minimal intelligence and functions only to transmit 
packets from end to end
4 on a “best-effort” basis without providing guaranteed quality 
of service (QoS) for the delivery.     
 
In  contrast,  managed  services  are  operating  in  a  more  controlled  environment.  
Managed services are operated over the managed Internet Protocol (IP) networks of 
the network operators.  The QoS of the service delivery is guaranteed by the network 
operators.  Intelligence may reside inside the networks and support innovations and 
                                                
1 For example, Department for Culture Media and Sport (United Kingdom) & Department for Business 
Innovation and Skills (United Kingdom), "Digital Britain Final Report" (2009), Report published in 
June 2009, pp. 58 - 64; Federal Communications Commission, "Connecting America: The National 
Broadband Plan" (2010), Report published on 16 March 2010; Communications and the Digital 
Economy (Australia) Department of Broadband, "New National Broadband Network" (2009), Media 
Release, 7 April 2009. 
2 The managed networks of the infrastructure correspond to the “Next Generation Network (NGN)” 
defined by the International Telecommunication Union as “a packet-based network able to provide 
telecommunication services and able to make use of multiple broadband, QoS [Quality of Service]-
enabled transport technologies and in which service-related functions are independent from underlying 
transport-related technologies.  It enables unfettered access for users to networks and to competing 
service providers and/or services of their choice.  It supports generalized mobility which will allow 
consistent and ubiquitous provision of services to users.”  See International Telecommunication Union 
Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) Recommendation Y.2001 (12/2004). 
3 The term “managed or specialized services” was used by the US Regulator in the October 2009 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the introduction of network neutrality regulation.  See Federal 
Communications Commission, "Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in the matter of Preserving the Open 
Internet, and Broadband Industrial Practices" (2009), FCC 09-93 adopted on 22 October 2009, p. 53.  
4 Lemley and Lessig (2001) describe “end-to-end” design as follows: “[The end-to-end argument] 
counsels that the ‘intelligence’ in a network should be located at the top of a layered system – at its 
‘ends’, where users put information and applications onto the network.  The communications protocol 
themselves (the ‘pipes’ through which information flows) should be as simple and as general as 
possible.”  See Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, "The End of End-to-End: Preserving the 
Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era" (2001) 48 UCLA Law Review 925, pp. 930 – 931. ITS Asia-Pacific Regional Conference, 26 – 28 June 2011, Taipei, Taiwan   
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security of the managed services.  The managed services are operated by the network 
operators  or  third-parties  with  whom  the  network  operators  have  entered  into 
agreements.  Hong Kong operators providing broadband access services to end-users 
(“access  providers”)  are  already  providing  QoS  assured  channels  over  the  access 
networks for their own Internet Protocol television (IPTV) and IP-based telephone 
services.  Examples of other managed services often mentioned are high-quality video 
conference services, virtual private network services, cloud computing services, smart 
grid services, tele-educational services and tele-medical services.
5    
  
Content,  applications  and  services  provided  over  the  Internet  and  the  managed 
networks will co-exist and compete with each other in the foreseeable future.
6  Some 
applications such as Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) and IPTV are available both 
on the Internet and the managed networks.   So far the concerns about discriminatory 
treatment of content, applications and services by access providers, in the so-called 
“network neutrality” (or “net neutrality”) debates, have focused on those provided 
over the Internet, but not on the managed networks.    
 
“Network  neutrality”  in  essence  means  the  non-discriminatory  treatment  of  data 
packets  transmitted  over  the  Internet  by  network  operators,  including  the  access 
providers,  involved  in  the  routing  and  transmission,  irrespective  of  their  origins, 
destinations,  applications  or  content.
7   A  common  concern  about  discriminatory 
practices is that the access providers may themselves provide content, applications or 
services,  or  be  affiliated  with  providers  of  such  products  (referred  to  as  “content 
providers” in the remainder of this paper
8) in the market.  In order to improve the 
market  position  of  their  own  products  or  those  of  affiliated  providers,  the  access 
providers may degrade the quality of transmission of, or in the extreme block, the 
traffic of competing content providers. 
 
Another  concern  is  about  the  establishment  of  different  tiers  of  services  for  the 
transmission  of  traffic  over  the  Internet.    The  access  providers  may  provide  the 
                                                
5 See, for example, AT&T Inc., "Comments of AT&T Inc. in the Matter of Preserving the Open Internet 
(GN Docket No. 09-191) and Broadband Industry Practices (WC Docket No. 07-52)" (2010), 
Submission to the FCC 14 January 2010, p. 7; Federal Communications Commission, "Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking in the matter of Preserving the Open Internet, and Broadband Industrial 
Practices" , para. 150. 
6 For a view on the competition between the Internet and NGN services, see Electronic 
Communications Committee (ECC) within the European Conference of Postal and 
Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT), "Next Generation Network Developments and Their 
Implications for the New Regulatory Regime" (2003), ECC Report 27, pp. 10 – 13. 
7 There  is  no  unified  definition  for  “network  neutrality”.    Issues  raised  by  “network  neutrality” 
proponents include “blockage and degradation of non-favoured content and applications”, “charging 
content  and  applications  providers  for  prioritized  data  delivery”,  “vertical  integration”  of  access 
providers, preserving “innovation at ‘edge’ of the Internet”, freedom of “political and other expression 
on the Internet”, “exclusive content and balkanization of Internet”, etc.  See Federal Trade Commission, 
"Broadband Connectivity Competition Policy" (2007), FTC Staff Report, June 2007, pp. 52 – 60 and 
79  –  80.    Others  refer  to  “mandating  interconnection,  non-discrimination,  rate  regulation  and  the 
adoption  of  standardized  interfaces  such  as  TCP/IP”.    See  Barbara  Van  Schewick,  "Towards  An 
Economic Framework for Network Neutrality Regulation" (2007) 5 Journal on Telecommunications & 
High  Technology  Law  329,  pp.  333 - 334.   Non-discriminatory  treatment  of  data  packets  in  their 
transmission is by far the commonest theme in network neutrality propositions. 
8 In this context, “content providers” may also include operators of platforms, such as aggregators of 
video content, and operators of application stores and application clouds, that host the content, 
applications and services. ITS Asia-Pacific Regional Conference, 26 – 28 June 2011, Taipei, Taiwan   
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prioritised channels for the traffic of their own content, applications or services, or 
those of the affiliated content providers, or the content providers who are willing to 
pay the higher level of charges, leaving the “slow lanes” (the non-prioritised channels) 
to non-affiliated content providers or those who are not willing to pay.  Some consider 
that the provision of different grades of service at different charges is not, in itself, 
discrimination,  but  if  the  access  providers  should  refuse  to  supply  the  prioritised 
channels to non-affiliated content providers, such practices may be discriminatory.
9 
 
“Network neutrality” issues have been hotly debated in the United States (US) for 
many years
10 and the debates have spread outside the US in recent years, but so far 
there has been little public attention to this issue in Hong Kong, probably due to the 
intense market competition in the supply of broadband Internet access services.   
 
On the basis of theoretical considerations and empirical evidence from the market, 
this paper examines four questions.  First, in the highly competitive market in Hong 
Kong, would there still be incentives for access providers to engage in discriminatory 
practices
11 against  content,  applications  and  services  on  the  Internet  and  on  the 
managed networks (Section 3)?  Second, would such discriminatory practices lead to 
“market failures”  (Section 4)?  Third, are the existing laws able to cope with the 
discriminatory practices if they should lead to “market failures” that justify regulatory 
intervention (Section 5)?  Fourth, should new regulation be introduced to tackle the 
discriminatory practices (Section 6)? 
   
This paper argues that in the competitive environment of Hong Kong, incentives for 
access providers to engage in discriminatory practices may still exist, particularly in 
the provision of carriage services over the managed networks.  So long as the Internet 
remains open as a communications infrastructure, discriminatory practices over the 
managed networks should not cause concerns from the public interest perspectives.  
However,  in  the  future,  the  best-effort  Internet  may  become  inadequate  as  a 
communications infrastructure for all types of content, applications and services.  The 
bandwidth-intensive and delay-sensitive content, applications and services may need 
to be delivered over the managed networks in order to achieve quality of service that 
meets users’ expectation.  In  this case, discriminatory practices over the managed 
networks would obstruct the achievement of the public interest goal of having an open 
communications infrastructure to serve the society.  This paper finds that the existing 
                                                
9 C. Scott Hemphill, "Network Neutrality and the False Promise of Zero-Price Regulation" (2008) 25 
Yale Journal on Regulation 135, p. 143; J. Gregory Sidak, "What is the Network Neutrality Debate 
Really About" (2007) 1 International Journal of Communication 377, p. 384; Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, 
"Antitrust Oversight of an Antitrust Dispute: An Institutional Perspective on the Net Neutrality Debate" 
(2009) 7 Journal on Telecommunications and High Technology Law 19, p. 33. 
10 There is a large body of literature on network neutrality in the US.  The earliest article widely cited is 
Tim Wu, "Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination" (2003) 2 Journal on Telecommunications 
and High Technology Law 141, pp. 141 – 175.  For an overview of the issues on “network neutrality”, 
see  Paul  Ganley  &  Ben  Allgrove,  "Net  Neutrality:  A  User's  Guide"  (2006)  22  Computer  Law  & 
Security  Report  454,  pp.  454  -  463;  Rob  Frieden,  "A  Primer  on  Network  Neutrality"  (2008) 
Intereconomics, January/February 2008, pp. 4 – 15. 
11 In this context, the term “discriminatory practices” does not necessarily carry a negative connotation.  
Discrimination is part of normal business practices when the operator is not obliged by law to deal with 
customers on a non-discriminatory basis.  Thus in the absence of regulation, access providers may 
decide whether, and on what terms, carriage services are to be provided to third-party content providers.  
The access providers are also expected to provide more than one grade of QoS over the managed 
networks. ITS Asia-Pacific Regional Conference, 26 – 28 June 2011, Taipei, Taiwan   
6 
 
laws  are  not  entirely  effective  to  tackle  discriminatory  practices  against  content, 
applications and  services  on  both the  Internet  and the managed  networks  that  are 
found to be contrary to public interests.  However, as the future developments of the 
Internet and the managed networks are far from clear, it is premature to introduce new 
regulation to tackle the discriminatory practices.  At this stage, the recommendable 
approach for the regulator is to adopt proportionate measures to keep the best-effort 
Internet open and maintain competition between the content, applications and services 
provided on the Internet and those on the managed networks. 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 introduces the Hong 
Kong environment.  Sections 3 to 6 deal with the four questions examined in this 
paper.  Section 7 draws some conclusions. 
 
2. The Hong Kong Environment 
 
In  Hong  Kong,  the  government  has  adopted  market-driven  policies  in  the 
telecommunications sector.  As self-built customer access networks of competitors to 
the fixed network incumbent have extensive coverage of the households, mandatory 
access to the incumbent’s local loops for competitors has been withdrawn in phases 
from July 2004 and fully terminated by 30 June 2008.
12  The regulator has declared 
that mandatory access to the incumbent’s unbundled local loops after June 2008 will 
be considered in situations where it can be established that the local loops constitute 
“essential facilities”.
13  The regulator has stated its intention to scale back ex ante 
regulation as the market becomes more competitive and its strategy will be to rely on 
facilities-based competition to promote investment in the next generation broadband 
infrastructure.  There is no government policy to invest, or subsidise the investment, 
in the next generation infrastructure.
14 
 
The high population and building densities in Hong Kong have enabled the parallel 
rollout of fibre-based networks to serve the consumer market.  Four fixed broadband 
networks  connected  to  domestic  premises  are  in  operation.
15   They  are  based  on 
Digital  Subscriber  Line  (DSL),  fibre-to-the-building,  fibre-to-the-home  and  cable 
modem  technologies,  providing  domestic  customers  with  a  wide  choice  of 
downloading  and  uploading  speeds,  up  to  1  Gigabits  per  second,  symmetrical  or 
unsymmetrical, although the more widely available connection speeds are up to 100 
Megabits  per  second.
16    According  to  information  from  the  Office  of  the 
Telecommunications Authority (OFTA) in Hong Kong, at the end of 2010, 86% of 
                                                
12 Mandated access to the local loops from the telephone exchanges has been withdrawn, but mandated 
access to the in-building wiring systems is still available should commercial negotiations for access fail.  
Office of the Telecommunications Authority (Hong Kong), "Review of Type II Interconnection Policy" 
(2004), Statement of the Telecommunications Authority, 6 July 2004, para. 16, available at 
http://www.ofta.gov.hk/en/tas/interconnect/ta20040706.pdf (last visited 9 April 2010) 
13 Id., paras. 1 and 5. 
14 Office of the Telecommunications Authority (Hong Kong), "Development of Broadband 
Infrastructure in Hong Kong" (2009), Regulatory Affairs Advisory Committee Paper No. 4/2009, 
available at http://www.ofta.gov.hk/en/ad-comm/raac/raacpaper.html (last visited 9 April 2010). 
15 Operated by PCCW, Hutchison, Hong Kong Broadband Network and i-Cable. 
16 Data from the websites of PCCW Netvigator at http://www.netvigator.com/ (last visited 8 April 2011), 
Hutchison Broadband at http://www.hgcbroadband.com/home.html (last visited 8 April 2011), Hong 
Kong Broadband Network at http://www.hkbn.net/bb1000/ (last visited 8 April 2011) and i-Cable at 
http://www.i-cable.com/ (last visited 8 April 2011). ITS Asia-Pacific Regional Conference, 26 – 28 June 2011, Taipei, Taiwan   
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households have choice of at least two broadband fixed access networks while 70% of 
households have choice of at least three such networks.
17   In addition, four third-
generation (3G) wireless networks, incorporated with the High-Speed Packet Access 
(HSPA)  or  Evolved  HSPA  (HSPA+)  technologies,  are  in  operation
18,  providing 
wireless  access  to  fixed,  mobile  or  nomadic  customers  although  they  are  not  yet 
viable  substitutes  for  the  wireline  networks  as  far  as  next  generation  access  is 
concerned, at least not until the wireless networks have been upgraded to the fourth-
generation (4G) technologies.  In recent years, OFTA has auctioned off additional 




Facilities-based  competition  based  on  independent  infrastructures  is  regarded  by 
many scholars as the ideal form of competition.
20  It is sustainable without regulatory 
intervention.  It also enables product differentiation as different competitors operate 
independent infrastructures to serve their customers.  This form of competition has 
been achieved in Hong Kong and is apparently sustainable.  The natural monopolistic 
characteristics of the access networks have been diluted by the high population and 
building densities.  Compared with the situations in other regions such as US and 
Europe, the incentives and ability of the access providers to engage in discriminatory 
practices are much diminished.    
 
However, in an environment which relies on facilities-based competition, the number 
of independent infrastructures that can be sustained is bound to be limited due to 
economy of scale and the limitation of space on and underneath the pavements of 
public streets to accommodate cable ducts and manholes.  This is so even in the more 
densely populated areas in Hong Kong.  Furthermore, even though there are now four 
independent  infrastructures  for  fixed  broadband  access  services  in  operation,  the 
actual choice available to the end-users at a given location will be less due to non-
overlapping coverage of the networks.  The data from OFTA on choice of broadband 
fixed  networks  have  combined  the  coverage  of  the  current  generation  and  next 
generation broadband fixed access.   Current generation access can be provided over 
local  loops  from  telephone  exchanges  using  DSL  technologies.    Next  generation 
                                                
17 Presentation by the Director-General of Telecommunications, OFTA to the media on 24 January 2011, 
obtainable at http://www.ofta.gov.hk/en/speech-presentation/2011/20110124.pdf (last visited 26 
January 2011). 
18 Operated by CSL, Hutchison, Vodafone-Smartone and PCCW. 
19 OFTA has auctioned spectrum in the 2.5/2.6 GHz bands and 850/900 MHz bands in 2009 and 2011 
respectively.  See OFTA press releases of 22 January 2009 available at 
http://www.ofta.gov.hk/en/press_rel/2009/Jan_2009_r1.html and 3 March 2011 available at 
http://www.ofta.gov.hk/en/press_rel/2011/Mar_2011_r1.html (last visited 28 March 2011).  
20 For example, Cave (2004) and Friederiszick, et al. (2008) consider that facilities-based competition 
can deliver product differentiation, innovation and lower regulatory costs (less need for regulatory 
intervention).  In comparison, service-based competition often only offers price competition enabled by 
regulation.  To Hausman and Sidak (2007), “the end-point of competitive local markets …… should be 
facilities-based competition” and should not be “regulation forever”.  See Martin Cave, "Making the 
Ladder of Investment Operational" (2004), Downloadable from 
http://www.ictregulationtoolkit.org/en/Publication.2916.html, p. 1; Hans Friederiszick, et al., 
"Analyzing the Relationship between Regulation and Investment in the Telecom Sector" (2008) ESMT 
White Paper No. WP-108-01, p. 11; Jerry Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, "Telecommunications 
Regulation: Current Approaches with End in Sight" (2007), NBER Conference on Economic 
Regulation and Its Reform: What Have We Learned, Conference held in 2005 (Paper revised in 
October 2007), p. 1. ITS Asia-Pacific Regional Conference, 26 – 28 June 2011, Taipei, Taiwan   
8 
 
access requires fibre rollout to locations much closer to the consumers’ premises.  The 
coverage of the next generation broadband fixed access networks will be smaller and 
the  number  of  choices  of  next  generation  fixed  access  networks  available  to 
households is expected to be lower than the data published by OFTA.   
 
It  can  also  be  expected  that  a  considerable  percentage  of  households  in  the  less 
densely populated areas cannot be reached by next generation fixed access networks 
in the medium term if reliance is made entirely on market forces for network rollout.  
Even  if  some  of  these  households  will  ultimately  be  connected  by  fibre-based 
networks, it is unlikely that the households will be connected by more than one such 
network based on commercial considerations.  These households have to wait for the 
upgrading of the wireless networks to 4G technologies before meaningful choice of 
next generation access networks is available to them.  
 
The choices to the end-users can be expanded if the infrastructure operators would 
open their networks to access-based or service-based competitors.  However, although 
price competition at the retail level among the facilities-based network operators is 
intense, the operators adopt similar  policies towards  network openness  to service-
based providers.  No wholesale products are offered to service-based competitors for 
the higher-bandwidth broadband access services for the mass market.  Service-based 
competitors for residential customers are practically non-existent in the market.   
 
For  the  above  reasons,  despite  the  existence  of  facilities-based  competition,  the 
barriers for end-users  at  certain  locations to  switch  suppliers  of  broadband  access 
services, particularly next generation access services, may be substantial.  How this 
would  impact  on  the  ability  and  incentives  of  the  access  providers  to  engage  in 
discriminatory practices will be examined below. 
 
3. Are There Incentives to Engage in Discriminatory Practices in the Hong Kong 
Environment? 
 
3.1 Theoretical Considerations 
 
When  scholars  discuss  discriminatory  practices  by  suppliers  in  a  primary  market 
against goods or services in a secondary market, they are normally concerned with 
suppliers that are in a monopoly position in the primary market.  Chicago School 
theorists argue that even a supplier in a monopoly position in the primary market does 
not have incentive to discriminate against goods or services in the secondary market.  
The monopoly supplier can capture the rent in the secondary market simply by raising 
the prices in the primary market.  This is the so-called “one-monopoly-rent theory”.
21   
 
The supplier of the primary goods or services will also benefit from a wide variety of 
goods  and  services  competing  in  the  secondary  market.    According  to  the 
“internalizing complementary efficiencies (ICE)” theory
22 put forward by Farrell and 
Weiser (2003), a wide variety of goods and services in the secondary market will 
                                                
21 Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Networks in Telecommunications: Economics and Law 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 144. 
22 Joseph  Farrell  &  Philip  J.  Weiser,  "Modularity,  Vertical  Integration,  and  Open  Access  Policies: 
Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age" (2003) 17 Harvard Journal of 
Law & Technology 85, pp. 100 - 103. ITS Asia-Pacific Regional Conference, 26 – 28 June 2011, Taipei, Taiwan   
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enhance the value of the primary goods or services to their users.  According to Speta 
(2000)
23, a new broadband user increases the value of the broadband access service to 
existing users through the “indirect” network effect, by attracting more content to be 
hosted in the access network thereby making the access service more valuable to all 
users.  Based on the ICE and indirect network effect arguments, the access provider 
would have the incentive to promote more content to be accessible from its network. 
 
Many  Post-Chicago  School  studies  have  identified  the  circumstances  in  which  a 
monopoly  or  dominant  supplier  in  the  primary  market  may  have  the  incentive  to 
discriminate in the secondary market in order to increase its profit in the secondary 
market or reinforce its position in the primary market.
24  The “one-monopoly-rent 
theory” assumes that a number of market conditions are satisfied.  For example, the 
primary  market  is  unregulated  and  the  complementary  product  in  the  secondary 
market is used in fixed proportion to the primary product.  These conditions may not 
be  satisfied.
25   Even  the  proposers  of  the  ICE  theory,  Farrell  and  Weiser,  have 
identified eight situations in which the monopoly supplier in the primary market may 
have the incentive to discriminate in the secondary market in order to increase its 
profit
26 –  for  example,  when  the  monopoly  supplier  faces  price  regulation  in  the 
primary market so that it cannot raise prices there.
27  According to Van Schewick 
(2007), access providers that face “limited competition” in the access service market 
may have the incentive to discriminate against non-affiliated content, applications and 
services on the Internet.
28  Whether an access provider will actually engage in such 
discriminatory  practices  depends  on  whether  the  benefits  from  the  blockage  or 
discrimination  exceed  the  costs.
29     For  example,  one  of  the  potential  benefits  of 
discriminatory practices to the access provider is to safeguard the sales of the access 
provider’s or affiliated providers’ products in the complementary market.  Another 
potential benefit is the maintenance of product differentiation that would reinforce the 
market position of the access provider in the primary market.
30  The principal cost of 
the discriminatory practices to the access provider is potential loss of customers due 
to customer dissatisfaction with the discriminatory practices. 
 
                                                
23 James B. Speta, "Handicapping the Race for the Last Mile?: A Critique of Open Access Rules for 
Broadband Platforms" (2000) 17 Yale Journal on Regulation 39, p. 80. 
24 For example, Pietro Crocioni, "Leveraging of Market Power in Emerging Markets: A Review of 
Cases, Literature, and a Suggested Framework" (2007) 4 Journal of Competition Law and Economics 
449, pp. 458 – 467; Janusz A. Ordover, et al., "Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure" (1990) 80 The 
American Economic Review 127, pp. 127 – 128; Michael D. Whinston, "Tying, Foreclosure, and 
Exclusion" (1990) 80 The American Economic Review 837, p. 839; Dennis W. Carlton, "A General 
Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct and Refusal to Deal - Why Aspen and Kodak are Misguided" (2001) 
68 Antitrust Law Journal 659, p. 669. 
25 See, for example, Crocioni, "Leveraging of Market Power in Emerging Markets: A Review of Cases, 
Literature, and a Suggested Framework", p. 458; Steven C. Salop, "Economic Analysis of Exclusionary 
Vertical Conduct: Where Chicago Has Overshot the Mark" in Robert Pitofsky (ed.) How the Chicago 
School Overshot the Mark: The Effect of Conservative Economic Analysis on U.S. Antitrust (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 145. 
26  Farrell  &  Weiser,  "Modularity,  Vertical  Integration,  and  Open  Access  Policies:  Towards  a 
Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age", p. 105. 
27 Id., p. 105 - 107. 
28 Van Schewick, "Towards An Economic Framework for Network Neutrality Regulation", p. 370. 
29 Id., pp. 375 – 378. 
30 Id., p. 374. ITS Asia-Pacific Regional Conference, 26 – 28 June 2011, Taipei, Taiwan   
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3.2 Considerations for the Hong Kong Environment 
 
The foregoing theories and exceptions are concerning the incentives to discriminate of 
a monopoly operator in the primary market.  In a competitive environment like Hong 
Kong, the access providers may lack the market power in the access service market 
that can be leveraged to affect competition in the market for content, applications and 
services.  The access providers therefore lack the ability and incentives to engage in 
discriminatory  behaviours  towards  the  content  providers.    However,  despite  the 
relatively  weak  market  power  vis-à-vis  the  customers  in  the  retail  access  service 
market, each access provider may still have a certain degree of market power vis-à-vis 
the content providers who need to use the access provider’s service for the delivery of 
content, applications and services to the end-users connected by the access service, in 
a manner similar to the “terminating access monopoly” held by any network operator 
in relation to the end-users connected to its network for the termination of telephone 
calls.
31  Such market power may, however, be constrained by the countervailing buyer 
power of the content providers and the ability of the end-users to switch to alternative 
suppliers in the market if they are dissatisfied with any degradation of the quality of 
transmission, or blockage, of the content, applications and services that they wish to 
access.
32    
 
Even if  the monopoly  power of an access provider exists, according to  the “one-
monopoly-rent theory” there may be some level of access prices at which the access 
provider would be indifferent as to whether the content is provided by itself or by 
unaffiliated third parties.  Thus the access provider may have no incentive to deny 
access  to  the  non-affiliated  content  if  the  access  price  received  is  high  enough.  
However, the ability of the access provider to charge this level of access price may be 
constrained by countervailing buyer power of the content providers and competition 
in the market
33 and if the revenue from providing access cannot offset the loss as 
perceived by the access provider, for example, due to diversion of revenue from its 
own content and applications, the access provider may still have the incentives to 
discriminate against the third-party content providers.   
 
According to the theories on ICE and indirect network effect, a wider range of content 
accessible from access services would enhance the value of those services and should 
also  be  welcomed  by  the  access  providers  even  in  a  competitive  environment.  
However, this may not necessarily be valid for all content and applications.  Some 
less significant content or applications may be considered by the access providers as 
bringing marginal value to the access services only.  Access providers may wish to 
exercise control over  which content or applications are  accessible  in order to, for 
example, establish certain specialization, style or reputation of the access services.  
The access providers are expected to balance the various benefit and cost factors in 
the decision-making process of whether to engage in discriminatory practices.  The 
                                                
31 See Federal Trade Commission, "Broadband Connectivity Competition Policy" , p. 77. 
32 For example, see Nuechterlein, "Antitrust Oversight of an Antitrust Dispute: An Institutional 
Perspective on the Net Neutrality Debate", footnote 34 at pp. 34 – 35. 
33 The countervailing buyer power of the content provider would constrain the ability of an access 
provider to set access prices.  The access provider is competing with other access providers in the same 
local market, or in the international market, in providing carriage services to end-users.  The content 
providers may not be targeting a particular group of end-users (so if the access price of a particular 
access provider is too high, the content providers may seek to deliver the content, applications and 
services to other groups of end-users connected by other access providers). ITS Asia-Pacific Regional Conference, 26 – 28 June 2011, Taipei, Taiwan   
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benefits and costs of discriminatory practices to the access providers in the  Hong 




The benefits to the access providers will be discussed under four headings, protecting 
revenue  from  affiliated  services,  maintaining  network  differentiation,  maintaining 
QoS and raising additional revenue through prioritised services. 
 
(1)  Protecting revenue from affiliated services  
 
According to Van Schewick (2007), one of the benefits to the access providers for 
discriminatory behaviours is to protect revenue from the content, applications and 
services operated by the access providers themselves or affiliated providers.
34  Such 
benefits need not depend on complete monopolization of the content market.
35  All is 
necessary is increased sales, because the price is typically above marginal costs in the 
production of the content, applications and services. 
 
The  four  broadband  access  providers  in  Hong  Kong  are  all  vertically  integrated 
operators in the sense that they all provide, or are affiliated with providers of, voice 
services  and  television  services.    The  voice  services  are  local  and  international 
telephone services provided using conventional or VoIP technologies.  The television 
services are IPTV services provided over the broadband connections or conventional 
cable television services.
36   
 
In Hong Kong, the intense competition in the primary market for the provision of 
broadband access means that profit margin is low.  It is natural that the operators will 
attempt to increase, or at least to preserve, sale of services in the secondary market to 
enhance or safeguard profit.  Revenue from local telephone services includes not only 
rental charges from the customers, but also payment of local access charges by other 
operators  when  the  customers  originate  or  receive  international  telephone  calls.
37  
Revenue from local and international telephone services still constitutes a significant 
proportion of the turnover of fixed network operators.
38  VoIP services provided over 
a broadband connection can provide alternatives for making local and international 
calls.  The international calls can be much cheaper than the international telephone 
                                                
34 Van Schewick, "Towards An Economic Framework for Network Neutrality Regulation", p. 372 – 374. 
35 Id., p. 364 – 368.  
36 PCCW provides local and international telephone services and IPTV services under the brandname 
“NOW TV”.  PCCW has also entered into an agreement with TVB Pay services to deliver the latter’s 
services over the former’s IPTV platform.  HGC provides local and international telephone services 
and is affiliated with TVB Pay services in delivering IPTV services.  HKBN provides IP-based local 
and international telephone services as well as IPTV services.  i-CABLE provides cable television 
services  and  is  affiliated  with  another  provider  in  the  same  corporate  group  providing  local  and 
international telephone services.  
37 Office of the Telecommunications Authority, “Local Access Charges of Fixed Telecommunications 
Network  Services  Operators  Other  than  Hong  Kong  Telecom”,  at 
http://www.ofta.gov.hk/en/tas/interconnect/ta990422.html (last visited 28 March 2011). 
38  According  to  the  financial  report  of  PCCW  for  the  year  2010,  the  revenue  from  local  and 
international telephone services constituted about 34% of the core revenue of the company.  The report 
is  accessible  at 
http://www.pccw.com/About+PCCW/Investor+Relations/Financial+Results?language=en_US&sdate=
20100101&edate=20101231&year=2010 (last visited 28 March 2011). ITS Asia-Pacific Regional Conference, 26 – 28 June 2011, Taipei, Taiwan   
12 
 
services  provided  using  conventional  means.    Calls  between  users  of  IP-based 
services  can  be  free  of  charge.
39   Some  VoIP  services  are  accessible  using  an 
instrument similar to the familiar telephone set thus enhancing the substitutability to 
non-technology savvy users.
40    
 
As  conventional  telephone  services face  substitution  by  VoIP  services and  mobile 
services, revenue from content like television services will be increasingly important 
to integrated operators.  Increased sale of television services will increase profit (or 
reduce  loss) as  many  of the cost  elements  of content  production are fixed.   New 
technologies for delivering high-resolution television services over the Internet might 
threaten revenue from the television services provided by the access providers.
41   
 
One incident in Hong Kong in  2004 illustrates the possibility  of access providers 
engaging  in  discriminatory  practices  in  order  to  protect  revenue  from  their  own 
services.    In  2004,  one  of  the  access  providers,  Hong  Kong  Broadband  Network 
(HKBN)  started  to  offer  a  VoIP  service  over  the  broadband  connections  of  the 
incumbent  operator,  PCCW.    HKBN  complained  that  PCCW  initially blocked  the 
VoIP service for a few hours upon its launch and the blockage was not terminated 
until a complaint was made to the regulator.
42  PCCW subsequently applied to court 
for an injunction to stop HKBN from offering the service.  The justification was that 
HKBN offered the service in breach of the conditions of its licence and that HKBN 
had  “free-ridden”  on  PCCW’s  broadband  connections.
43   Network  operators  may 
consider that content providers should pay a charge for the usage of their networks to 
carry the content.
 44 The justification of PCCW in the 2004 incident, that the VoIP 
service of HKBN had “free-ridden” on PCCW’s network, had reflected this viewpoint.  
The real reason may well be that the VoIP service had the potential of threatening the 
core business of PCCW in its local fixed telephone line services and international 
telephone services.  The VoIP services provided by overseas providers which impose 
time-based charges to calls within Hong Kong would be of less threat to a local fixed 
network  operator,  as  there  are  no  call  charges  for  local  telephone  calls  over  the 
                                                
39 For example, calls between two Skype users on-line are free of call charges.  Such free calls between 
personal  computers  are  also  available  for  other  instant  messaging  services,  such  as  Windows 
Messenger, Yahoo! Messenger, etc. 
40 For example, Hong Kong Broadband Network offers an adapter box which connects a traditional 
telephone  set  to  the  broadband  access  line.    The  information  is  accessible  at 
http://www.hkbn.net/BBphone/demo.htm (last visited 28 March 2011).  Vonage also offers a similar 
adaptor  box:  http://www.vonage.com/how_vonage_works/?refer_id=WEBHO0706010001W  (last 
visited 28 March 2011). 
41 FCC referred to such threat to Comcast’s cable services in Comcast decision, Memorandum Opinion 
and Order, FCC 08-183, released 20 August 2008, paragraph 5.  Another example is the BBC iPlayer 
service  which  offers  high  definition  television  over  the  Internet  for  viewers  within  the  UK  – 
information available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IPlayer (last visited 28 March 2011). 
42 See news report on Hong Kong Economic Times (《香港經濟日報》), 3 August 2004.  OFTA has 
not issued any statement confirming this blockage. 
43 See news report on South China Morning Post, 7 October 2004. 
44 The  often  quoted  response  from  the  US  former  AT&T  CEO  Ed  Whitacre to a  media  interview 
question in 2005 reflected this attitude:  
Now what [Google, MSN, Vonage and other Internet content providers] would like to do is use 
my pipes free, but I ain’t going to let them do that because we have spent this capital and we have 
to have a return on it.  So there’s going to have to be some mechanism for these people who use 
these pipes to pay for the portion they’re using.  Why should they be allowed to use my pipes? 
 “At SBC, It’s All About ‘Scale and Scope’”, Business Week Online, 7 November 2005, obtainable at:    
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_45/b3958092.htm (last visited 29 April 2011). ITS Asia-Pacific Regional Conference, 26 – 28 June 2011, Taipei, Taiwan   
13 
 
conventional  telephone  lines,  but  a  service  with  all  the  characteristics  of  a 
conventional telephone line service would pose a more serious threat.  PCCW later 
decided to settle the case by withdrawing the application for injunction.
45  HKBN’s 
service  continued  to  be  offered  in  the  market.    However,  the  general  terms  and 
conditions  of  the  broadband  services  provided  by  PCCW  contain  the  following 
condition (which continues to exist as of March 2011): 
 
Without  limitation  to  the  above  disclaimer  or  any  other  provision  in  this 
Agreement,  you  acknowledge  and  agree  that  unless  we  have  entered  into  an 
agreement with a Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) service provider allowing it 
to use NETVIGATOR BROADBAND to deliver VoIP services then such service 
provider  will  continue  to  have  no  entitlement  to  use  NETVIGATOR 
BROADBAND to deliver VoIP services and accordingly, it may not be possible 
to access VoIP services supplied by such service provider using NETVIGATOR 
BROADBAND or, if accessible, the standard or quality of such VoIP services 
may be adversely affected. A list of VoIP service providers who have entered into 
an agreement with us to utilize NETVIGATOR BROADBAND to deliver VoIP 
services is available on www.netvigator.com.
46  
 
No such list of VoIP service provider has been found on the website of PCCW and 
there has been no report since 2004 about PCCW blocking or degrading the quality of 
transmission for any VoIP service, but the fact that PCCW sees the need to retain this 
condition in the standard terms and conditions is an indication of its preparedness to 
deviate from network neutrality to protect its commercial interests. 
 
(2)  Maintaining network differentiation 
 
Van  Schewick  (2007)  has  pointed  out  that  one  of  the  reasons  for  discriminatory 
behaviours of access providers is to preserve product differentiation.
47  As part of the 
competition strategies in the market, the four access providers in Hong Kong have 
differentiated  their  products  in  terms  of  television  programme  content,  speed  of 
connections, quality of customer service, etc.  Television programme content forms an 
important part of these differentiation strategies.   Each access service is tied to a 
specific  set  of  television  programme  services.    Customers  of  that  access  service 
cannot access the television platforms of the competing access providers.  Content 
available from the Internet will dilute such differentiation of network operators.  If the 
content that customers need or are accustomed to is available from the Internet, they 
would find it less inconvenient or disruptive to switch to the access service of another 
operator  as  all  broadband  connections  are  functionally  similar.    Access  providers 
therefore may view the availability of certain content on the Internet as a threat, not 
only  to  their  own  revenue,  but also  to  the  product  differentiation  that  they  try  to 
maintain. 
 
(3)  Maintaining QoS  
 
Every  access  provider  has  a  need  to  safeguard  quality  of  services.    The  need  to 
                                                
45 See news report on Hong Kong Economic Journal (《信報財經新聞》), 1 December 2004. 
46 PCCW, Netvigator Broadband Terms and Conditions, part of Condition No. 7. 
47 Van Schewick, "Towards An Economic Framework for Network Neutrality Regulation", p. 374. ITS Asia-Pacific Regional Conference, 26 – 28 June 2011, Taipei, Taiwan   
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maintain quality of service is even more critical in a competitive environment like 
Hong Kong.  An access provider stands to lose out to its competitors if it cannot 
maintain quality of service to the satisfaction of its customers.  Although the capacity 
of the “last-mile” links between the end-users and the facilities of the access providers 
has increased substantially and there is less likelihood of congestion over these links, 
the  resources  beyond  these  links,  including  the  aggregation  networks  and  the 
connections to the Internet exchange or backbone operators are still shared among the 
customers of the access provider.  The access provider would have the need to control 
and manage traffic over these limited resources to maintain quality of service to the 
majority  of  users  and  to  avoid  the  need  of  making  uneconomical  investment  in 
capacity expansion.  One apparently legitimate approach is to give higher priority to 
packets of delay-sensitive applications without degrading the quality of transmission 
of  the  less  delay-sensitive  applications  to  an  unacceptable  level.    The  more 
controversial approach would be to impose restrictions against certain heavy users 
who use the service “excessively”, or to discriminate against or even block certain 
types of bandwidth-intensive applications.   
 
(4)  Raising additional revenue from prioritised services 
 
It  is  also  entirely  possible  that  the  access  providers  will  wish  to  sell  prioritised 
services  to  content,  application  or  service  providers  in  order  to  raise  additional 
revenue.  There seems to be no obvious reason why the access providers would not 
exploit  all  technically  and  economically  feasible  means  to  increase  their  revenue 
unless the law forbids this practice.  As a matter of fact, the four access providers in 
Hong Kong are already providing prioritised transport channels to their own services 
like IPTV over managed IP networks or cable TV over dedicated channels.  OFTA 
takes  the  position  that  VoIP  services  may  be  offered  in  a  mode  which  entails  an 
interconnection agreement between the access provider and the VoIP service provider 
for guaranteed quality of delivery.
48  Whether the services over the non-prioritised 
channels are still handled with an acceptable quality of service depends on the policy 
of the operators.  The non-prioritised services may not suffer deliberate degradation, 
but the allocation of resources between the prioritised services and non-prioritised 
services  would  affect  the  quality  of  the  non-prioritised  services  perceived  by  the 
customers.  The operators stand the risk of losing customers at the retail level if the 




The foregoing paragraphs have discussed the potential benefits to access providers in 
engaging in discriminatory practices against content, applications and services on the 
Internet.  There are costs associated with these benefits.  The principal cost to the 
access  providers  in  engaging  in  blockage  or  discrimination  is  that  the  broadband 
access service becomes less attractive to customers.  The result is less sales to new 
customers or switching of existing customers to other operators.   The more intense 
the competition, the higher will be such costs.  One would therefore expect such costs 
to be relatively high in the Hong Kong environment.  However, the magnitude of the 
costs  is  also  affected  by  the  ability  and  willingness  of  customers  to  switch  to 
                                                
48 Office of the Telecommunications Authority (Hong Kong), "Network Neutrality" (2009), Regulatory 
Affairs Advisory Committee Paper No. 2/2009, p. 19. ITS Asia-Pacific Regional Conference, 26 – 28 June 2011, Taipei, Taiwan   
15 
 
alternative access providers in the market.  In Hong Kong, the ability of the customers 
to switch may be restricted in some areas where certain access networks do not have 
coverage, but the behaviours of the access providers should be constrained by the 
intense competition  in  areas  where  the  customers  do  have the ability  to  switch.
49  
Therefore  the  behaviours  of  access  providers  would  be  mainly  affected  by  the 
willingness of the end-users to switch suppliers in areas where the end-users have 
choice. 
 
The first factor affecting the willingness of customers to switch is the impact of the 
discrimination to the customers.  Whether a customer will actually decide to switch 
depends on the value to that particular customer of the content or application which 
has been blocked or discriminated against.  The customer is less inclined to switch if 
the  content  or  application  is  not  considered  by  the  customer  as  significant  (for 
example, the content or application is provided by a start-up or relatively unknown 
operator whose products have not been proven or gained wide market acceptance) or 
if he/she does not use that content or application anyway.  Thus the costs to the access 
provider  of  engaging  in  discriminatory  practices  may  well  depend  on  the  market 
power of the content providers that the access provider is dealing with.   
 
The  second  factor  affecting  the  willingness  of  customers  to  switch  is  product 
differentiation in the market.  The appeal of the access provider’s products in terms of 
content, speed, reliability or customer service may induce new customers to join or 
existing customers  to  stay  despite the  discrimination against  or  blockage  of  some 
products  from  third-parties.    This  also  explains  why  access  providers  may  be 
concerned about the dilution of product differentiation from the accessibility of all 
content and applications on the Internet from all broadband access networks.   
 
The existing evidence from the market shows that the access providers are competing 
vigorously for customers.  They compete on the basis of ever higher speeds in the 
access networks, larger bandwidth in external links and smoother Internet experience.  
Apart  from  engaging  in  what  the  access  providers  claim  to  be  reasonable  and 
necessary network management practices, there is no evidence that they are engaging 
in  discriminatory  degradation  of  transmission  quality  or  blockage  of  content, 
applications and services on the Internet.  At least there have been no reports in the 
media about blatant discriminatory behaviours of the access providers.  The reason for 
this is that there is a general expectation among the end-users that the Internet should 
be  open.    The  regulator  is  also  expected  to  maintain  vigilance  on  discriminatory 
practices against content, applications and services on the Internet.  Any unreasonable 
discriminatory practice against content, applications and services on the Internet is 
likely  to  arouse  public  attention,  bring  bad  reputation  against  the  access  provider 
concerned, with the consequence of substantial loss of market share.   
 
Another reason is related to how the service providers and network operators of the 
best-effort  Internet  are  paid  for  the  carriage  services  they  provide.    The  access 
                                                
49 Even though the actual number of choice available to the users is less in some areas where certain 
competing networks do not have coverage, as explained in Section 2, the access providers are expected 
to adopt the same policy throughout the entire territory of Hong Kong in providing access to third-party 
content and applications.  The behaviours of the access providers will be constrained by the 
competition in areas where all competing networks have coverage and the users do have the ability to 
switch suppliers. ITS Asia-Pacific Regional Conference, 26 – 28 June 2011, Taipei, Taiwan   
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providers are paid by the end-users and content providers for the connections to the 
Internet.    The  access  providers  in  turn  pay  the  higher-tier  service  providers  and 
backbone operators through transit arrangements.  Operators that consider themselves 
to  be  at  the  same  tier  of  the  Internet  hierarchy  may  have  among  them  peering 
arrangements  for  traffic  exchange.    In  this  way,  there  is  no  need  for  the  content 
providers  to negotiate a contract  with the access providers for  the  delivery of the 
content and there is no way for the access providers to collect a toll from the distant 
content providers.   There is therefore no reason for an access provider to block, or 
degrade  the  transmission  quality  of,  a  particular  content  provider  based  on  the 
justification of failure to reach a commercial agreement with the content provider.  
Any  such  discriminatory  act  would  be  unilateral  and  is  likely  to  be  regarded  as 
unreasonable.    For  a  Hong  Kong  access  provider,  any  attempt  to  raise  additional 
revenue by threatening to block or degrade the quality of service of content providers 
who do not agree to pay the carriage charge is unlikely to be successful.  As Hong 
Kong is just a small market, content providers that target the worldwide or regional 
markets are unlikely to accede to a Hong Kong operator’s demand for payment of 
carriage charge.   A  Hong  Kong  access  provider  who  puts  the  threat into  practice 
would likely face the high costs due to loss of customers at the retail level.   
 
The  situation  would  be  different  with  respect  to  the  managed  networks.   
Differentiation in the content, applications and services accessible from the managed 
networks is the market norm and accordingly there is no user expectation that they 
can reach any content and applications by entering the relevant Uniform Resource 
Locators (URL) as for the Internet.   For example, the IPTV platform available on a 
particular access network is generally not accessible from the other access services. 
The end-users of the access services are able to access the content, applications and 
services of only those content providers that can reach agreements with the access 
providers.  Whether an agreement would be concluded depends on the cost-benefit 
considerations of both parties in reaching an agreement.  
 
The cost-benefit considerations of the access providers for providing access to the 
managed  networks  are  similar  to  those  for  the  Internet.    Allowing  access  to  its 
network  would bring the benefits of additional revenue from content carriage and 
higher value of the access service to the end-users as a result of more content being 
accessible from the service.  However, the costs to the access provider are potential 
diversion of revenue from the access provider’s own or affiliated content, reduced 
product  differentiation  as  the  content  may  also  be  accessible  from  other  access 
networks and possibly more congestion or additional investment necessary to cope 
with the increased demand on the network resources. 
 
The  QoS  assured  carriage  services  over  the  managed  networks  are  sources  of 
additional revenue to enable the access providers to recoup their investment in rolling 
out the access networks.  The investment in next generation access networks will 
involve substantial capital and risks.  The access providers are likely to have incentive 
to maximize the revenue from the managed networks.  The access providers would 
not  be  content  with  operating  their  networks  only  as  “pipes”  supplying 
“commoditized” transmission products.  Non-discriminatory access to the managed 
networks may lead to commoditization of the carriage services.  The access providers 
may therefore wish to engage in discriminatory practices such as price discrimination 




It  is of course also possible for the content  providers to engage  in discriminatory 
practices against the access providers.  Even on the Internet, it has been reported that 
content providers with market power have sought to levy charges on access providers 
for making the content available to the end-users connected to the access networks.
50  
Likewise on the managed networks, the content providers will also have their own set 
of cost-benefit considerations in deciding whether, and on what terms, the content 
should be made available to the access networks and their end-users.
51   If the content 
providers and the access providers cannot reach agreement, access to the content will 
be withheld.     
  
In conclusion, whether the access providers and the content providers will engage in 
discriminatory practices depends on their cost-benefit considerations of engaging in 
such practices.  In a competitive environment for the access services, the costs to the 
access providers of engaging in such practices are expected to be high.  Based on 
current evidence from the market, access providers in Hong Kong are likely to remain 
open  with  regard  to  content,  applications  and  services  on  the  Internet  but 
discriminatory practices in providing access to the managed networks appear to be the 
market norm.  The next question to consider is whether the discriminatory practices of 
the access providers and the content providers would lead to “market failures”.  
 
4. Would the Discriminatory Practices Lead to “Market Failures”? 
 
4.1 Theoretical Considerations 
 
Under the market system of economic organisation, it is believed that individuals and 
groups should basically be left free to pursue their own private welfare goals.  The 
individual pursuits of private interests will, collectively, achieve public welfare goals.  
The state stays in the periphery of the market and its role is restricted to maintaining 
the  institutions  essential for  the  functioning  of  the  free  market.   The state  should 
intervene, through “regulation” or “regulatory law”, only when the market fails to 
achieve goals in the public interest.
52 
 
In economic terms, a “market failure” is a situation where the market acting alone 
fails to deliver some measure of efficiency or maximize social welfare.  Economic 
regulation  is  a  form  of  state  intervention  to  address  such  market  failures.    The 
common forms of market failures – existence of natural monopolies, externalities, 
                                                
50 AT&T Global Network Services (UK) B.V., "Comments of AT&T Global Network Services (UK) 
B.V.: Ofcom Consultation Paper on Traffic Management and 'Net Neutrality'" (2010), Submission to 
Office of Communications (UK), 9 September 2010, Engineering Background, p. 5.  AT&T refers to 
the practice of the content providers as “reverse-blocking”. 
51 From the point of view of the content provider, making the content available to the access networks 
would bring more revenue from the advertisers or subscribers.  However, the content provider may 
withhold access to its content for various reasons.  For example, the content provider may wish to 
charge the access provider a fee that the access provider is not willing to pay.  The content provider 
may wish to reserve the content for its own or affiliated access providers so as to reinforce their market 
position in the supply of access services.  The content provider may be constrained by intellectual 
property right restrictions in the choice of distribution channels for its content. 
52 Anthony Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 
1 – 2; Alfred E. Kahn, The Economics of Regulation: Principles and Institutions (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1988), p. 2/I. ITS Asia-Pacific Regional Conference, 26 – 28 June 2011, Taipei, Taiwan   
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public  goods  and  information  deficiencies  –  that  justify  regulation  have  been 
extensively discussed in neo-classical economics literature.
53   
 
Frischmann (2005) develops an economic theory for regulating “infrastructure” based 
on the considerations of externalities and public goods.  He defines an “infrastructure” 
as  a  resource  satisfying  three  criteria,  namely,  that  the  resource  is  “nonrival  or 
partially (non)rival goods”
54, that “social demand for the resource is driven primarily 
by downstream productive activity that requires the resource as an input” and that 
“[t]he resource may be used as an input into a wide range of goods and services, 
including private goods, public goods and non-market goods”.
55  If a resource is an 
“infrastructure”,  it  is  socially  desirable  that  it  is  managed  as  “commons”,  which 
means that it is openly accessible, because of the substantial positive externalities 
generated in using the resource to produce the public goods and non-market goods
56.  
The willingness of the producers to pay for access is unlikely to be able to capture the 
social  value  of  the  public  goods  and  non-market  goods  due  to  measurement 
problems.
57   
 
In a similar vein, Lessig (2001) argues for preserving certain resources, such as the 
Internet,  as  “free”  resources  or  “commons”  in order  to  preserve  the  Internet  as  a 
platform for innovations.
58  In his  view, a “free” resource  does not  mean that the 
resource can be used without charge, but rather the resource is open for use by anyone 
without seeking the permission of anyone else or if such permission is required, it is 
granted  in  a  neutral  manner.
59   Van  Schewick  (2007)  and  Frischmann  and  Van 
Schewick  (2007)  describe  the  Internet  as  an  infrastructure  employing  “general 
                                                
53 When natural monopolies exist in the market, the number of suppliers in the market may need to be 
restricted.  Regulation is applied to control market entry.  Without effective competition, products may 
be overpriced and under-produced.  Regulation is applied to protect public interest.  When externalities 
exist in the market, unintended third parties gain or lose as a result of the transaction between two 
parties.  In the presence of externalities, the market cannot capture such unintended gain or loss and 
cannot achieve efficiency in the use of resources.  Regulation is also necessary in the supply of “public 
goods” as a special class of externalities.  The benefits of “public goods” are not diminished when more 
people consume it and cannot be withheld from anyone.  As a result, no one is likely to be interested in 
paying for the “public goods” and state intervention is required to secure its production.  Finally, where 
information available in the market is deficient, e.g. information asymmetry between the suppliers and 
the consumers, the market cannot function efficiently.  Regulation seeks to overcome this information 
deficiency.  See Robert Baldwin & Martin Cave, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy, and 
Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 9 - 12; Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and 
Economic Theory, pp. 30 - 41; Anthony Ogus & C.G. Veljanovski (eds.), Readings in the Economics of 
Law and Regulation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 235 - 236. 
54 By “nonrival” goods, Frischmann refers to “pure public goods”.  By “partially (non)rival goods”, 
Frischmann refers to resources that are subject to congestion at times, depending on the capacity and 
number of users.  During off-peak hours when the number of users is low, the consumption may be 
nonrival.  During peak-hours, the consumption may be rival.  “Partially (non)rival goods” may be 
referred to as “club goods”. 
55 Brett M. Frischmann, "An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management" (2005) 
89 Minnesota Law Review 917, p. 956. 
56 Frischmann describes a “public good” as non-rival.  Innovation is often referred to as “public good”. 
“Non-market goods” are “those goods that are neither provided nor demanded through the market 
mechanism”.  Examples given are “active participation in democratic dialogue; voting; free speech”, 
etc.  See Id., pp. 964 – 965. 
57 Id., pp. 974 - 977. 
58 Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World (New York: 
Vintage Books, 2001), pp. 19 – 23. 
59 Id., p. 12. ITS Asia-Pacific Regional Conference, 26 – 28 June 2011, Taipei, Taiwan   
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purpose technology” which according to Lipsey et al. (1998) has four characteristics - 
scope for evolutionary improvement, wide  variety of uses, wide range of  use and 
strong technological complementarities with existing or potential new technologies.
60  
Innovations and the usage of “general purpose technology” generate benefits for the 
entire society that are external to the innovators, users and the infrastructure operators.  
The infrastructure operators are not capable of internalising such benefits and would 
not take the positive externalities into account in their decision making.  The level of 
innovations and use of the “general purpose technology” will then be lower than the 




The  theories  of  Frischmann  (2005),  Lessig  (2001),  Van  Schewick  (2007)  and 
Frischmann and Van Schewick (2007) express the public interest goals in economic 
terms,  being  maximizing  economic  welfare  through  non-discriminatory  access  to 
certain types of resources.  There are, however, some public interest goals that cannot 
be  defined  in  terms  of economic efficiency.   Social  regulation  may  be applied  to 
achieve these non-economical goals not delivered by the market.
62   
 
In a series of articles, Benkler (1998, 2000, 2001 and 2003) made a case for setting up 
a “core common infrastructure” to achieve the non-economic goals of enabling robust 
democratic discourse and securing freedom of expression.
63  To achieve these goals, 
the infrastructure should not be subject to the exclusive control of any person in the 
use and disposition of its resources and should be “equally open to all” to disseminate 
and exchange information.
64  He argued that the existing mass media model enables 
only a limited number of commercial producers to “serve a menu of prepackaged 
information goods to consumers whose role is limited to selecting from this menu”.
65  
Instead,  the  passive  “consumers”  should  turn  into  “users”  originating  as  well  as 
receiving information without restrictions from the common infrastructure.  Benkler 
                                                
60 Richard G. Lipsey, et al., "What Requires Explanation?" in Elhanan Helpman (ed.) General Purpose 
Technologies and Economic Growth (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1998), pp. 38 – 43. 
“Scope for evolutionary improvement” means that the technologies “enter as fairly crude technologies 
with a limited number of uses, but they evolve into much more complex technologies with dramatic 
increase in the range of their use across the economy and the number of economic outputs that they 
produce”.  “Variety of use” refers to the different types of usage.  “Range of use” refers to “the 
proportion of the productive activities in the economy using that technology”.  “Technological 
complementarities” is defined “as occurring whenever a technological change in one item of capital 
requires a redesign or reorganization of some of the other items that cooperate with it”. 
61 Van Schewick, "Towards An Economic Framework for Network Neutrality Regulation", pp. 385 – 
386; Brett M. Frischmann & Barbara Van Schewick, "Network Neutrality and the Economics of an 
Information Superhighway: A Reply to Professor Yoo" (2007) 47 Jurimetrics 383, pp. 427 - 428. 
62 Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory, pp. 46 - 54. 
63 Yochai Benkler, "From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation Towards 
Sustainable Commons and User Access" (2000) 52 Federal Communications Law Journal 561, p. 579; 
Yochai Benkler, "The Political Economy of Commons" (2003) Vol. IV Upgrade: The European 
Journal for the Informatics Professional 6, p. 9. 
64 Yochai Benkler, "The Commons as a Neglected Factor of Information Policy" (1998), TPRC 1998, 3 
- 5 October 1998, pp. 27 – 28; Yochai Benkler, "Property, Commons, and the First Amendment: 
Towards a Core Common Infrastructure" (2001), White Paper for the First Amendment Program, 
Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, March 2001, pp. 2 – 5; Benkler, 
"The Political Economy of Commons", pp. 6 and 8; Yochai Benkler, "Freedom in the Commons: 
Towards a Political Economy of Information" (2003) 52 Duke Law Journal 1245, pp. 1273 – 1274.  
65 Benkler, "From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation Towards 
Sustainable Commons and User Access", p. 562. ITS Asia-Pacific Regional Conference, 26 – 28 June 2011, Taipei, Taiwan   
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was not arguing that all communications facilities need to be operated as commons, 




Another public interest goal that has traditionally been achieved through common law 
is that for certain types of businesses, no one making a reasonable request for service 
and willing to pay the established price would be denied lawful access to the service.  
Nachbar (2008) has conducted a review of the circumstances in which obligations of 
providing non-discriminatory access (common carriage) are imposed on businesses 
“affected with public interest” under common law.  He finds that the obligations of 
common  carriage  are  imposed  on  businesses  connected  with  transportation  and 
communications
67 and that market power has little connection with the imposition of 
the obligations.
68  He considers that every telecommunications network that offers 
services  to  the  public  is  a  “public  network”  whether  or  not  it  is  operated  in  a 
monopolistic or competitive environment, and should be subject to the obligation to 
provide “non-discriminatory access”.
69      
 
Some scholars dispute that non-discriminatory access to the network infrastructure is 
necessarily  a  public  interest  goal.    For  example,  Becker,  Carlton,  et  al.  (2010) 
consider  that  “preserving  a  free  and  open  Internet”,  a  goal  advocated  by  the  US 
regulator,  is  not  “[b]y  itself”  “an  economically  appropriate  goal  of  public  policy, 
which instead should focus on maximizing consumer welfare”.
70   Spulber and Yoo 
(2009)  do  not  consider  that  discriminatory  behaviours  of  infrastructure  operators 
necessarily constitute market failures.  The discriminatory behaviours would lead to 
“network  diversity”.    Spulber  and  Yoo  consider  that  users’  preferences  are 
heterogeneous  and  their  differentiated  needs  can  best  be  satisfied  by  “network 
diversity”.  The differentiation allows higher level of revenue and enables multiple 
customer access networks to co-exist even though the economy of scale for each has 
not  been  exhausted.    “Network  diversity”  therefore  promotes  investment  and 
competition in the access networks.  On the other hand, the provision of access on a 
non-discriminatory basis would lead to “network uniformity”.  In an environment of 
“network uniformity”, the access providers compete on the basis of price only and this 
gives decisive advantages to the larger infrastructure operators with lower costs and 
could reinforce one source of market failure that regulation is meant to address – the 
existence of monopoly in the operation of access networks.
71 
 
Some  scholars  consider  that  innovations  inside  the  networks  are  as  important  as 
innovations at the edge of the networks and therefore dispute the promotion of edge-
based innovations at the expense of network-based innovations.  For example, Sidak 
and Teece (2010) consider that innovations in the network infrastructure would also 
generate positive “spillover” benefits and such spillovers have been overlooked by 
                                                
66 Benkler, "Freedom in the Commons: Towards a Political Economy of Information", pp. 1273 – 1274; 
Benkler, "The Political Economy of Commons", p. 8. 
67 Thomas B. Nachbar, "The Public Network" (2008) 17 CommLaw Conspectus 67, pp. 103 – 104. 
68 Nachbar also finds that under common law, “necessity” or “holding out [as offering a service to the 
public]” is not a sufficient basis for classifying a business as “affected with the public interest”.  See Id., 
pp. 96 – 102, pp. 85 – 86 and 93.   
69 Id., p. 139. 
70 Gary S. Becker, et al., "Net Neutrality and Consumer Welfare" (2010) 6(3) Journal of Competition 
Law and Economics 497, p. 499. 




72  Some scholars however consider that if the potential 
for innovation lies predominately in the layer of content, applications and services, it 
would be more desirable to promote open access to the networks rather than facilities-
based competition among the access networks.  For example, De Bijl and Peitz (2008) 
consider that if users seek only reliability and capacity of connections from the access 
networks, the users’ need for innovation is best satisfied by competition at separate 
network and application layers without the networks acting as “gatekeepers”.
73  Bauer 
(2010) considers that “[i]f the content and application layer has a significantly greater 
innovation potential than the network platform layer and complementarities are weak, 
then vertical policies that foster players on that layer (e.g., strict non-discrimination 
rules) may be more desirable.”
74 
 
In sum, there is little disagreement that regulation is justified only in situations of 
“market failures”.   However,  there is divergence  of opinion in  the literature as to 
whether discriminatory practices of access providers would lead to “market failures”.  
Economists  tend  to  confine  “market  failures”  to  situation  whereby  economic 
efficiency or social welfare is not maximized.  However, some scholars extend the 
concept of “market failures” to failure to achieve public interest goals and these goals 
need  not  be  defined  on  economic  terms.    Whether  discriminatory  behaviours  of 
infrastructure operators would lead to “market failures” would therefore depend on 
the public interest goals that the society wishes to achieve.  This is a public policy 
issue best resolved by political means in a democratic society.  If the public interest 
goal  is  to  have  an  open  communications  infrastructure  for  the  society,  then 
impediments  to  the  proper  functioning  of  the  infrastructure  due  to  discriminatory 
practices would constitute market failures to attain this public interest goal. 
 
4.2 Considerations for the Hong Kong Environment 
 
The  governments  of  major  developed  countries  acknowledge  the  importance  of  a 
communications  infrastructure  to  the  countries.    For  example,  the  US  regulator, 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC), compares a broadband infrastructure to 
the  railroads,  highways  and  electricity  infrastructure  of  the  past  and  regards 
broadband as “the great infrastructure challenge of the early 21
st century” (emphasis 
in  original).
75    The  United  Kingdom  (UK)  government  considers  that  “UK’s 
communications infrastructure is a vital enabler for the country’s society, economy, 
safety, security and well being.”
76   
 
To these governments, the Internet is the core of this communications infrastructure.  
The  FCC  refers  to  the  “high-speed  Internet”  as  “transforming  the  landscape  of 
America more rapidly and more pervasively than earlier infrastructure networks”.
77  
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74 Johannes M. Bauer, "Regulation, Public Policy, and Investment in Communications Infrastructure" 
(2010) 34 Telecommunications Policy 65, p. 76.  
75 Federal Communications Commission, "Connecting America: The National Broadband Plan" , p. 3. 
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The Digital Agenda for Europe issued by the European Commission (EC) setting out 
the actions required to attain the policy objectives in Europe 2020 states that “[t]he 
future economy will be a network-based knowledge economy with the internet at its 
centre”
78 and the objective of the Agenda is “to chart a course to maximise the social 
and economic potential of ICT, most notably the internet, a vital medium of economic 
and societal activity”.
79  The Australian Labor Party states that “high-speed broadband 
internet access throughout Australia will help enable significant productivity gains, 
the growth of new businesses and the development of new markets”.
80    
 
Furthermore, governments stress the importance of keeping the Internet open.  In US, 
the FCC stated that the purpose of its network neutrality regulation is to keep the 
Internet  as  “an  open  platform  for  innovation,  investment,  job  creation,  economic 
growth,  competition,  and  free  expression”.
81   In  Europe,  the  EC  declared  that  it 
“attaches  high  importance  to  preserving  the  open  and  neutral  character  of  the 
Internet”.
82   The European Parliament and the Council recognised that “the Internet is 
essential  for  ……  the  practical  exercise  of  freedom  of  expression  and  access  to 
information”, and “any restriction on the exercise of these fundamental rights should 
be in accordance with the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms”.
83  The EC stated that one of the objectives of the 2009 
regulatory reform was “to promote a high quality of service and unobstructed access 
to  digital  and  online  content”  in  the  European  information  society.
84  National 
regulatory authorities are to promote the citizens’ interests by “promoting the ability 
of end-users to access and distribute information or run applications and services of 
their choice”.
85  In addition, the EC has attached a declaration on “net neutrality” to 
the end of the “Better Regulation Directive”
86 to the effect that the EC attaches high 
                                                
78 European Commission, "Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
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79 Id., p. 3. 
80Australian Labor Party, “National Platform” (2009), available at http://www.alp.org.au/australian-
labor/our-platform/ (last visited 20 January 2011), Chapter 3, para. 37. 
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importance  to  preserving  the  open  and  neutral  character  of  the  Internet  and  will 
monitor the implementation of the new provisions in the regulatory package and make 
a report to the Parliament and the Council by the end of 2010. 
 
The ICT policy document in Hong Kong has not explicitly referred to the availability 
of  an  open  communications  infrastructure  to  serve  the  Hong  Kong  society.
87  
However it acknowledges that “a robust information infrastructure, just as essential 
physical  infrastructure,  is  crucial  to  supporting  and  propelling  the  growth  of 
economies”.
88   Given the almost universal acceptance amongst developed economies 
of  the  link  between  an  open  communications  infrastructure  and  innovations, 
investment, job creation and social well-beings, and Hong Kong’s aspirations to be an 
international city and a regional communications hub, it would be surprising if the 
availability  of  open  communications  infrastructure  is  not  a  public  interest  goal  in 
Hong Kong.   
 
At  present,  the  Internet  is  performing  the  functions  of  the  global  information 
infrastructure.    Although  some  scholars  consider  that  an  open  Internet  is  not 
necessarily an appropriate public interest goal and that consumers’ welfare may well 
be better served by “network diversity”, such views apparently are not shared by the 
politicians and policymakers in developed countries.  In an environment of “network 
diversity”,  users’  choice  of  content,  applications  and  services  would  not  be 
compromised  if end-users  could  readily  switch between a  large  number  of  access 
connections.
89  However, as end-users typically subscribe to only one fixed broadband 
connection per household and possibly one mobile connection per user at any one 
time, it is difficult to see how the end-users’ access to content, applications or services 
of their choice would not be restricted when each connection does not offer non-
discriminatory access to all content, applications and services that end-users may wish 
to have access to. 
 
In  contrast  with  the  Internet,  the  managed  networks  as  a  communications 
infrastructure are not explicitly mentioned in the government policy documents.  The 
reason for this is possibly that the relationship between the Internet and the managed 
networks is not well understood at this stage.  However, there is no reason why the 
public policy objective of having an open communications infrastructure for a society 
should be confined to the provision of best-effort delivery services only and exclude 
the delivery services with QoS assurances.  When referring to the functions of the 
Internet,  the  policy  documents  include  practically  all  societal  activities  embracing 
doing  business,  working,  playing,  communicating,  expressing  freely,  health  care, 
education,  transport,  clean  environment,  media,  public  services,  entertainment, 
cultural services and so on.  In this context, the Internet should be an Internet that is 
adequate in performance to meet the evolving demands of the society.   
 
One possible scenario in the future is that the managed networks would take over the 
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functions of the Internet for critical or delay-sensitive applications as some content 
providers make arrangements to secure the QoS for the delivery of their content.  It is 
already  a  current  practice  that  some  content  of  the  Internet  are  delivered,  by 
international  or  regional  managed  networks  (such  as  “content  delivery  networks” 
(CDNs) or self-provided “caching networks”), to cache storage located as close as 
possible  to  the  end-users  although  the  final  links  to  the  end-users  may  still  be 
provided  over  the  best-effort  Internet.
90   It  is  also  possible  that  the  content  are 
delivered by the international or regional managed networks directly to the managed 
networks  of  the  access  providers.      In  this  case,  the  best-effort  Internet  will  be 
bypassed for the entire delivery path.     
 
Another  possible scenario is for  the managed networks  of the access providers to 
become part of the global Internet of the future.  The managed network operation is 
based on the Internet Protocol (IP) and is therefore well suited for integration with the 
Internet.    The  Internet  Protocol  has  already  incorporated  mechanisms  for 
implementing  different  grades  of  QoS,  but  widespread  deployment  has  been 
obstructed by pricing and billing problems across network boundaries.
91  When these 
commercial  issues  are  resolved,  the  Internet  might  be  incorporated  with  QoS 
functionalities.  It will then be necessary for Internet to be connected to the managed 
networks of the access providers in order to provide end-to-end QoS functionalities 
across the Internet.      
 
If the managed networks should supplant the functions of the Internet, or become part 
of  the  Internet,  there  would  be  a  need  to  consider  whether  the  public  interest 
objectives  applicable  to  the  Internet  should  be  equally  applicable  to  the  managed 
networks.    The  FCC  has  indicated  that  it  will  monitor  the  operation  of  the 
“specialized”  services  which  are  currently  excluded  from  the  network  neutrality 
regulation.
92   If  the  services  provide  a  function  equivalent  to  broadband  Internet 
access services or are used to evade the network neutrality regulation, they will be 
caught by the regulation.
93 
 
The potential for discriminatory practices does not exist only at the access network 
level of the communications infrastructure.  As noted in Section 3, it is possible for 
content providers to engage in discriminatory practices in allowing access providers 
to have access to their content, applications and services.  Market power may also 
shift  to  the  upper  levels  of  the  communications  infrastructure,  such  as  platforms 
hosting  the  content,  applications  and  services,  and  search  engines  acting  as 
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Internet and Broadband Industry Practices" , paras. 113 – 114. 
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intermediaries between the providers of those products and the end-users.  There have 
been calls for “openness” or “neutrality” of the providers operating at any level of the 
communications infrastructure that may act as “gatekeepers” to content, applications 
and services.
94  Whether discrimination problems at the levels other than the access 
services would lead to “market failures”, whether competition law alone is adequate 
to address these problems, and whether regulation at these levels is warranted are 
issues that need much more research, but are beyond the scope of this paper.     
  
In conclusion, a public interest goal widely adopted in developed countries is to have 
an  open communications infrastructure for the society.  The functions of an open 
communications infrastructure should include best-effort services and services with 
guaranteed QoS.  Discriminatory practices of the access providers against content, 
applications and services on the Internet may constitute a “market failure” as they 
impede the attainment of the goal of having an open communications infrastructure 
based  on  the  Internet.    So  long  as  the  Internet  performs  adequately  as  an  open 
communications infrastructure, discriminatory practices for content, applications and 
services on the managed networks should not for the time being cause concerns from 
the public interest perspectives.   If in the future the best-effort  Internet becomes 
inadequate to perform fully the functions of an open communications infrastructure, 
discriminatory practices on the managed networks would need close scrutiny.  The 
next  question  is  whether  the  existing  laws  are  adequate  to  tackle  discriminatory 
practices if found to lead to “market failures”. 
 
5. Are the Existing Laws Adequate to Deal with Discriminatory Practices? 
 
5.1 Telecommunications Regulation 
 
In Hong Kong, telecommunications networks and services are regulated under the 
Telecommunications Ordinance (TO).
95  Networks and services need to be licensed 
under the TO, unless exemption has been given by the Chief-Executive-in-Council.
96  
Licences  may  be  issued  by  the  Chief-Executive-in-Council,  or  the  regulator,  the 
Telecommunications Authority (TA).
97  In practice, all telecommunications networks 
and services operated in Hong Kong are licensed under licences issued by the TA.
98  
In issuing the licences, the TA is empowered to prescribe a wide range of conditions, 
including general conditions and special conditions.
99 The operation of the networks 
and services has to comply with the provisions in the TO as well as conditions under 
the  licences.
100   In  this  way,  the  operation  of  telecommunications  networks  and 
                                                
94 For example, see AT&T Inc., "Comments of AT&T Inc. in the Matter of Preserving the Open Internet 
(GN Docket No. 09-191) and Broadband Industry Practices (WC Docket No. 07-52)", p. 196; Frank 
Pasquale, "Internet Non-Discrimination Principles: Commercial Ethics for Carriers and Search 
Engines" (2008) 2008 University of Chicago Legal Forum 263, pp. 276 – 286. 
95 Chapter 106, Laws of Hong Kong accessible from http://www.legislation.gov.hk/eng/home.htm (last 
visited 28 April 2011). 
96 Sections 8(1), 20 and 39, Telecommunications Ordinance. 
97 Section 7, Telecommunications Ordinance. 
98 The Chief-Executive-in-Council issues only exclusive licences (section 7(1), Telecommunications 
Ordinance).  From the list of licences published by OFTA, there are no exclusive licences in Hong 
Kong: http://www.ofta.gov.hk/en/tele-lic/main.html (visited 2 December 2009). 
99 Sections 7 and 7A, Telecommunications Ordinance. 
100 If the licensee fails to comply with the provisions in the TO or conditions under the licence, the TA 
may issue directions requiring the licensee to comply with the provisions or conditions (section 36B, 
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services, including broadband access services, is brought under regulation. 
 
Access providers are licensees under a type of licences called “carrier licence”.
101  
The provisions in the TO and licence conditions that may potentially be relevant to 
discriminatory  practices  of  the  access  providers  are  those  related  to  “common 
carriage”, “non-discrimination” and “access and interconnection”.  The equivalent to 
the  “common  carriage”  obligation  is  a  licence  condition  requiring  the  licensee  to 
provide the service, on the terms and conditions published in a tariff, upon request 
from a customer at a location reasonably covered by the licensee’s network.
102  Thus 
an access provider is obliged to provide its access service to a customer located within 
its network coverage, but the licence condition does not govern the carriage of content 
by the access service provided.  The “non-discrimination” obligation is part of the 
industry-specific competition law under the TO and will be discussed in Section 5.2 
below.  Regarding “access  and interconnection”, a special  condition in the carrier 
licence
103 prescribes the following requirements: 
 
(1)  The licensee shall interconnect  its service and network with the services and 
networks  of  other  unified  carriers,  mobile  carriers,  fixed  carriers,  or  fixed 
telecommunications network services licensed under the Ordinance and, where 
directed  by  the  Authority,  interconnect  its  service  and  network  with 
telecommunications  networks  and  services  of  a  type  mentioned  in  section 
36A(3D)  of  the  Ordinance.    The  licensee  shall  interconnect  its  service  and 
network with the services and networks of other interconnecting parties under 
this Special Condition to ensure any-to-any connectivity, i.e. any customer in any 
one  network  can  have  access  to  any  other  customer  in  any  interconnecting 
network  and,  where  directed  by  the  Authority,  to  any  service  offered  in  any 
interconnecting network.   
 
(2)  The licensee shall use all reasonable endeavours to ensure that interconnection is 
effected promptly, efficiently and on terms, conditions and at charges which are 
based on the licensee’s reasonable relevant costs attributable to interconnection. 
 
Under the TO, the TA may determine the terms and conditions of interconnection
104 
and issue direction to a licensee requiring it to take such action as the TA considers 
necessary in order for the licensee to secure the connection of the licensed service to 
“any other telecommunications service being the subject of a licence granted under 
the Ordinance or of an [exemption order]”.
105 
 
The types of services mentioned in the section 36A(3D) referred to in the licence 
condition are telecommunications services licensed or exempt from licensing under 
                                                                                                                                       
Telecommunications  Ordinance),  or  even  suspend  or  revoke  the  licence  (section  34, 
Telecommunications Ordinance). 
101 Carrier licences are used to license facilities-based network operators.  Nearly all access providers in 
the consumer market in Hong Kong are facilities-based. 
102 Special Condition 2, Fixed Carrier Licence and Special Condition 10.1, Unified Carrier Licence, 
Telecommunications Ordinance. 
103 Special Condition 3, Unified Carrier Licence, Telecommunications Ordinance.  Special Condition 3 
of  a  Fixed  Carrier  Licence  contains  similar  requirements,  except  that  the  clause  on  “any-to-any 
connectivity” is absent. 
104 Section 36A, Telecommunications Ordinance. 




106  “Telecommunications” means “any transmission, emission or reception of 
communication  by  means  of  guided  or  unguided  electromagnetic  energy  or  both, 
other than any transmission or emission intended to be received or perceived directly 
by the human eye”.
107  “Communication” refers to the intelligence being carried by 
telecommunications.
108  “Telecommunications  service”  means  “a  service  for  the 
carrying of communication by means of guided or unguided electromagnetic energy 
or  both”.
109   The  effect  of  these  rather  long-winded  definitions  is  to  confine  the 
meaning  of  “telecommunications”  to  the  carriage  (by  wireline  or  wireless 
technologies),  rather  than  the  provision,  of  content.    It  is  quite  apparent  that  the 
obligation to “interconnect” under the above licence condition and the powers of the 
TA  to  intervene  in  “interconnection”  are  concerning  interconnection  between 
telecommunications networks or services licensed under the TO for the carriage of 
communication, including content.   
 
The  analysis  in  the  preceding  paragraph  has  implications  on  the  use  of  the 
interconnection powers to address the problems related to discriminatory practices of 
access providers.  In the special case of blockage or degradation of the quality of 
service of a telecommunications service licensed under the TO, such as a VoIP service 
operated by another access provider licensed in Hong Kong, the blockage may mean 
refusal  to  interconnect,  while  degradation  may  mean  refusal  to  interconnect  at  a 
satisfactory  level  of  quality  of  service,  with  the  telecommunications  service  in 
question.    As  the  network  and  the  service  of  the  other  access  provider  are  both 
licensed under the TO, the TA’s power on directing interconnection will be applicable.  
However, outside this special category, such as the blockage or degradation of content, 
applications and services that are not subject to the licensing requirement under the 
TO, and a telecommunications service provided by an operator outside Hong Kong 
and  therefore  not  licensed  under  the  TO  (such  as  a  VoIP  service  operated  by  an 
operator without presence in Hong Kong), the interconnection power of the TA will 
not be applicable because the content, applications or services subject to blockage or 
degradation are not telecommunications services licensed in Hong Kong.   
 
The  licence  condition  in  the  carrier  licence  has  referred  to  the  obligation  of  the 
licensee to achieve “any-to-any connectivity” through the interconnection.  According 
to the licence condition, “any-to-any connectivity” enables any customer connected to 
any  one  network  to  have  access  to  any  other  customer  connected  to  any 
interconnecting network.  A content provider leases a broadband connection from an 
access provider and may therefore be regarded as a “customer” of the access provider.  
                                                
106 Section 36A(3D) provides that the type of interconnection includes an arrangement among 2 or 
more parties for  
(a)  interconnection between telecommunications systems or services including  
(i)  those licensed under section 7, expressed as being licensed under section 7 or 34 or deemed to 
be licensed by the Chief Executive in Council under this Ordinance under section 8(3) of the 
Television Ordinance (Cap. 32);  
(ii)  those of a description mentioned in section 8(4)(e) and (f) [which are telecommunications 
systems not related to the Internet];  
(iii) telecommunications services that are the subject of an order made under section 39…… 
107 Section 2, Telecommunications Ordinance. 
108 Section  2  of  the  Telecommunications  Ordinance  provides  that  “communication”  includes  any 
communication (a) whether between persons and persons, things and things or persons and things; and 
(b) whether in the form of speech, music or other sounds, or text, or visual images whether or not 
animated, or signals in any other form or combination of forms”. 
109 Section 2, Telecommunications Ordinance. ITS Asia-Pacific Regional Conference, 26 – 28 June 2011, Taipei, Taiwan   
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It would appear that the “any-to-any connectivity” obligation would enable an end-
user  connected  to  one  access  provider  to  have  access  to  any  content  provider 
connected to another access provider licensed in Hong Kong.  This would ensure 
access of the end-user to at least any content hosted in Hong Kong. 
 
Such an expansion of the regulation on access and interconnection to secure access to 
content on the Internet or the managed networks would be problematic.  The policy 
intention  of  the  “any-to-any  connectivity”  obligation  can  be  ascertained  from  the 
public  consultation  paper  concerning  the  creation  of  the  “unified  carrier  licence” 
incorporated  with  this  obligation.
110    The  paper  indicated  that  “[any-to-any] 
connectivity is an important public policy objective that is based on the long-standing 
expectation of the public that any telecommunications user can communicate with any 
other user”.
111  The paper referred further to an interconnection principle that “[a]ny 
customer in any one network can have access to any other customer or any service 
offered in any interconnecting network”.
112  The “any-to-any connectivity” obligation 
is therefore a legacy of the regulation on public telephone networks to ensure that any 
end-user connected to a network can communicate with any other end-user, or have 
access to any telecommunications service (such as international telephone service), 
connected  to  an  interconnecting  network.    To  extend  the  meaning  of  “any-to-any 
connectivity” to include the access by any end-user connected to an access network to 
any content provider connected to an interconnecting network would be untenable.  In 
practice, this “any-to-any connectivity” is not achieved for content on the broadband 
access networks in Hong Kong.  As pointed out in Section 3.2 (under the heading of 
“maintaining  network  differentiation”),  the  customers  of  each  access  service  are 
unable to gain access to the television platforms connected to the competing access 
services.     
 
Access  and  interconnection  regulation  is  also  not  applicable  to  the  connections 
between telecommunications networks and content providers.  Regulation on access 
and  interconnection  is  enacted  to  address  the  particular  problems  in  a 
telecommunications market, such as to achieve the public interest objective of “any-
to-any connectivity” as discussed above, to deal with network effect which places 
larger  networks  at  a  competitive  advantage,  and  to  address  bottleneck  problems 
hindering  the  development  of  competition  in  the  telecommunications  market.
113    
Extending the regulation on access and interconnection to include non-discriminatory 
access  to  networks  for  content  providers  would  stretch  it  beyond  its  intended 
functions.  It is therefore unlikely that the power for the telecommunications regulator 
to compel the carriage of content is included in the provisions regulating access and 
interconnection.    It is  relevant  to  note  that  not  even  the  broadcasting  regulator  is 
empowered  to  compel  a  broadcasting  licensee  to  carry  particular  content.    Any 
requirement to carry a  specific type  of  programmes  (“must-carry”  requirement)  is 
separately spelt out in the law.
114   
                                                
110 Office  of  the  Telecommunications  Authority  (Hong  Kong),  "Licensing  Framework  for  Unified 
Carrier Licence" (2007), Consultation Paper, 21 December 2007. 
111 Id. at para. 24. 
112 Id. at para. 26. 
113 Spulber & Yoo, Networks in Telecommunications: Economics and Law, pp. 323 - 324; Eli M. Noam, 
"Interconnection Practices" in Martin Cave, et al. (eds.), Handbook of Telecommunications Economics 
(Amsterdam: Elsevier Science B.V., 2002), p. 389. 
114 For  example,  the  obligation  of  a  licensee  to  carry,  as  required  by  the  Broadcasting  Authority, 




Regulation on access and interconnection is also not used to secure content carriage in 
the  US  and  Europe.    In  the  US,  the  interconnection  obligations  applicable  to 
“telecommunications  carriers”  are  for  the  benefits  of  other  “telecommunications 
carriers” only.
115  In any case, the FCC has reclassified broadband access services as 
“information services”, thus removing the interconnection obligations applicable to 
“telecommunications  carriers”  from  the  obligations  of  the  access  providers.
116   In 
Europe,  even  though  the  EC  has  stated  that  one  of  the  objectives  of  the  2009 
regulatory reform is “to promote a high quality of service and unobstructed access to 
digital and online content” in the European information society
117 and the national 
regulatory authorities are to promote the citizens’ interests by “promoting the ability 
of end-users to access and distribute information or run applications and services of 
their choice”
118, the ability of the authorities to intervene on content matters will be 
constrained by their actual powers to regulate, and resolve disputes on, access and 
interconnection.
119   The definition for “access” is “the making available of facilities 
and/or services to another undertaking …… for the purpose of providing electronic 
communications  services,  including  when  they  are  used  for  the  delivery  of 
information  society  services  or  broadcast  content  services”.
120    “Electronic 
communications services” are services for the conveyance of signals on electronics 
communications networks, including telecommunications services and transmission 
services  in  networks  used  for  broadcasting,  but  specifically  exclude  services 
providing, or exercising editorial control over, content.
121  The powers of the national 
                                                                                                                                       
(Cap. 562). 
115 US legislation Telecommunications Act 1996, section 251, 47 U.S.C. §251. 
116 For example, wireline broadband access services have been reclassified as “information services” in 
2005.  See Federal Communications Commission, "Report and Order and Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking in the matters of Appropriate Framework for Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, 
Universal Service Obligations of Broadband Providers, Review of Regulatory Requirements for 
Incumbent LEC Broadband Telecommunications Services, Computer III Further Remand Proceedings: 
Bell Operating Company Provision of Enhanced Services; 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review- Review 
of Computer III and ONA Safeguards and Requirements, Conditional Petition of the Verizon Telephone 
Companies for Forbearance Under 47 U.S.C. 160(c) with Regard to Broadband Services Provided Via 
Fiber to the Premises; Petition of the Verizon Telephone Companies for Declaratory Ruling or, 
Alternatively, for Interim Waiver with Regard to Broadband Services Provided Via Fiber to the 
Premises, Consumer Protection in the Broadband Era" (2005), FCC 05-150, 20 FCC Rcd 14853 
adopted on 5 August 2005 and released on 23 September 2005. 
117 European Commission, "Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Report on 
the Outcome of the Review of the EU Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications 
Networks and Services in accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC and Summary of the 2007 Reform 
Proposals" , p. 4. 
118 Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a 
common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework 
Directive) as amended by Directive 2009/140/EC and Regulation 544/2009, Article 8(4)(g). 
119 Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on access to, 
and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities (Access Directive) 
as amended by Directive 2009/140/EC, Article 5. 
120 Directive 2009/140/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 
amending Directives 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications 
networks and services, 2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications 
networks and associated facilities, and 2002/20/EC on the authorisation of electronic communications 
networks and services (OJ L337/37 - L337/69, 18 December 2009), Article 2(1)(a), p. L337/59. 
121 Directive  2002/21/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  7  March  2002  on  a 
common  regulatory  framework  for  electronic  communications  networks  and  services  (Framework 
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regulatory authorities related to access and interconnection are therefore confined to 
access arrangements between providers of conveyance services and cannot be used to 
intervene  in  the  arrangements  between  a  provider  of  conveyance  services  and  a 
content provider.  Indeed, “must carry” obligations for specified radio and television 
broadcast channels are explicitly provided for in a separate article of the Universal 
Service Directive.
122   
 
In  conclusion,  the  non-discriminatory  carriage  of  content  on  the  Internet  or  the 
managed  networks  by  the  access  providers  is  not  a  subject-matter  that  should  be 
addressed by regulation on access and interconnection. 
 
5.2 Competition Law 
 
In Hong Kong there is not yet a general competition law.  The bill for a general 
competition law is now going through the legislative procedure and the government 
plans for its enactment by summer 2012.  Before the bill becomes law, reliance has to 
be  made  on  the  industry-specific  competition  provisions  in  the  laws  regulating 
telecommunications and broadcasting.
123  For the telecommunications industry, there 
are provisions under the TO prohibiting anti-competitive agreements or arrangements 
(section 7K) and abuse of dominant position (section 7L) similar to Articles 101 and 
102 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
124  In addition, 
there is a prohibition on discrimination which has anti-competitive purpose or effect 
(section 7N).
125   
 
The TO is a law regulating the telecommunications industry and the jurisdiction of the 
telecommunications  regulator  extends  only  to  telecommunications  licensees  in  the 
industry.  The competition  provisions in the  TO therefore regulate the conduct of 
telecommunications licensees only.  There is no doubt that the access providers are 
telecommunications licensees.  However, the competition provisions prohibit conduct 
that has the purpose or effect of preventing or substantially restricting competition in 
a telecommunications market.  The word “telecommunications” should have the same 
meaning  as  that  in  the  TO.    The  content,  applications  and  services  affected  by 
discriminatory  practices  of  the  access  providers  may  not  be  telecommunications 
services.  Therefore it may not be competition in a telecommunications market that is 
                                                
122 Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on universal 
service  and  users'  rights  relating  to  electronic  communications  networks  and  services  (Universal 
Service Directive) as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC, Article 31. 
123 Paragraph 61, Policy Address 2008/09, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong SAR. 
124 Section 7K of the Telecommunications Ordinance prohibits conduct, which, in the opinion of the TA, 
has the purpose or effect of preventing or substantially restricting competition in a telecommunications 
market.  Section 7L prohibits a licensee in a dominant position in a telecommunications market from 
abusing its position.  Such a licensee has abused its position if, in the opinion of the TA, the licensee 
has  engaged  in  conduct  which  has  the  purpose  or  effect  of  preventing  or  substantially  restricting 
competition in a telecommunications market.   
125 Section 7N of the Telecommunications Ordinance prohibits (1) a licensee in a dominant position in 
a telecommunications market from discrimination between persons who acquire services in the market 
on  charges  or  the  conditions  of  supply,  and  (2)  an  exclusive  licensee  or  a  carrier  licensee  from 
discrimination  between  a  person  who  lawfully  acquires  and  uses  telecommunications  networks, 
systems installations, customer equipment or services to provide services to the public and any other 
person who is not providing a service to the public.   Both prohibitions are subject to the condition that 
the  discrimination  is  unlawful  only  if  it  has  the  purpose  or  effect  of  preventing  or  substantially 
restricting competition in a telecommunications market. ITS Asia-Pacific Regional Conference, 26 – 28 June 2011, Taipei, Taiwan   
31 
 
being compromised.  This would limit the application of the competition provisions in 
the TO to tackle the discriminatory practices.  
 
The prohibitions of discrimination under section 7N do not extend the effectiveness of 
the industry-specific competition provisions under the TO to tackle the discriminatory 
practices of access providers.  There are two prohibitions under section 7N.  The first 
prohibition is against discrimination by a telecommunications licensee in a dominant 
position  that  has  anti-competitive  purpose  or  effect  in  a  telecommunications 
market.
126  This prohibition is in fact already covered by the prohibition of abuse of 
dominance  under  section  7L  and  is  largely  redundant.    The  second  prohibition  is 
against  the  discrimination  by  a  carrier  licensee  (irrespective  of  market  position) 
between end-users and persons who acquire the services from the carrier licensee for 
the provision of public telecommunications services.
127  This prohibition is intended 
to prevent discrimination between end-users and service providers and is not relevant 
to the discriminatory practices of access providers against content providers. 
 
Even when a general competition law along the line of Articles 101 and 102 of the 
TFEU is enacted in Hong Kong, the law may not be entirely effective to tackle the 
discriminatory practices if they arise in Hong Kong.  Chirico, Van Der Haar, et al. 
(2007) and Valcke, et al. (2008) have analysed the use of European competition law to 
tackle the conduct of access providers deviating from network neutrality principles.
128  
They found that the Article 82 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community 
(EC)  (previous  version  of  Article  102,  TFEU)  is  not  effective  in  addressing  the 
problems in some circumstances.  Where an access provider in a dominant position 
degrades the quality of transmission of third-party content providers compared with 
the quality provided to its own or affiliated content providers, thereby placing the 
former providers at a competitive disadvantage, the access provider may be in breach 
of Article 82.
129  However, dealing with blockage and refusal to provide prioritised 
services is less straightforward.  Where this access provider blocks the content from 
third-party providers without objective justifications, the conduct may be regarded as 
a refusal to deal with the third-party providers.
130  The access provider may be in 
breach of Article 82 only if it can be established that the transmission facilities of the 
access provider are “essential facilities”.
131  However, Chirico, Van Der Haar, et al. 
(2007) consider that proving that a particular access network is “essential facilities” is 
more difficult after Oscar Bronner when other access services are available in the 
market.
132   Likewise,  discriminatory  practices  in  the  supply  of  prioritised  services 
may  also  be  analysed  as  a  refusal  to  supply  the  prioritised  channels  to  the  non-
affiliated providers.  It would be difficult to prove that the prioritised channels are 
                                                
126 Section 7N(1). 
127 Section 7N(2).  This prohibition applies only if it has the purpose or effect of preventing or 
substantially restricting competition in a telecommunications market. 
128 Filomena Chirico, et al., "Network Neutrality in the EU" (2007) TILEC Discussion Paper No. DP 
2007-30, pp. 1 - 67, at pp. 37 – 39 and pp. 58 – 65; Peggy Valcke, et al., "Network Neutrality: Legal 
Answers from an EU Perspective" (2008), The International Telecommunications Society 17th Biennial 
Conference, 24 - 27 June 2008, pp. 14 - 20. 
129 Valcke, et al., "Network Neutrality: Legal Answers from an EU Perspective", p. 16. 
130 Chirico, et al. consider that if the access provider has provided access to some content providers in 
the market, but refuses to provide access to other content providers, this form of blockage may be dealt 
with as anti-competitive discrimination.  See Chirico, et al., "Network Neutrality in the EU", p. 36.   
131 Valcke, et al., "Network Neutrality: Legal Answers from an EU Perspective", p. 14. 
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“essential facilities” in the presence of the non-prioritised channels even though using 




The  general  competition  law  when  enacted  in  Hong  Kong  will  prohibit  anti-
competitive conduct of an operator with a “substantial degree of market power”.  If 
the access provider discriminating against certain Internet content providers does not 
possess this level of market power, its conduct would not be caught by the law.  As 
explained in Section 3.2, some scholars consider that the access providers possess 
market  power  vis-à-vis  the  content  providers  in  the  delivery  of  the  content, 
applications and services to the end-users connected by the access services.  However, 
such market power may be counteracted by countervailing buyer power of the content 
providers and potential switching of end-users to alternative suppliers in the market.  
Thus whether sufficient level of market power can be established for the competition 
law to apply would depend on the circumstances of individual cases.  Furthermore, 
with multiple broadband fixed access networks connected to 86% of the households, 
it  may  be  difficult  to  establish  that  any  of  the  networks  are  “essential  facilities”.  
Refusal to deal with a third-party content provider may not constitute a breach under 
the “essential facilities” doctrine. 
 
In conclusion, even if a general competition law in Hong Kong is enacted in the future, 
it may not be entirely effective to deal with discriminatory practices against third-
party content, applications and services on the Internet or the managed networks. 
 
5.3 Consumer Protection Law 
 
More  recent  works  of  scholars  have  suggested  that  problems  arising  from 
discriminatory practices of access providers should best be tackled through enhanced 
consumer protection measures.  Access providers should be required to disclose their 
network management practices and the performance of their services so that the end-
users can make informed choice in the market and the regulators can judge whether 
the practices are reasonable.  Unreasonable practices can be dealt with on a case-by-
case basis.
134   
 
Requirements  for  access  providers  to  disclose  information  relevant  to  consumer 
interest are dealt with by consumer protection laws.  In Hong Kong, section 7M in the 
TO prohibits conduct of licensees which, in the opinion of the TA, is misleading or 
deceptive  in  providing  telecommunications  networks,  services  and  equipment, 
including (but not limited to) promoting, marketing or advertising the networks.  Thus 
when the access providers disclose information to consumers, the information must 
not be misleading or deceptive.  However, section 7M does not compel the access 
providers to disclose specific types of information to the consumers, such as network 
management  practices  or  usage  restriction  policy,  unless  the  omission  of  the 
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information amounts to misleading or deceptive conduct.  It could be argued that if a 
certain type of information is critical or material to the consumers in their decisions to 
use  or  not  to  use  a  particular  broadband  access  service,  failure  to  disclose  such 
information  may  be  a  breach  of  section  7M.
135   However,  the  current  level  of 
consumer awareness in Hong Kong may not have reached such level as to make the 
non-disclosure of highly technical information about network management practices 
and usage restriction policy a breach of section 7M.  When it comes to achieving 
sufficient  transparency  on  such  practices  and  policy,  a  positive  obligation  on  the 
access providers to disclose information would be much more preferable to a negative 
obligation of not to mislead or deceive because the standards of the information to be 
disclosed would be much more certain and known beforehand. 
 
There are also no explicit provisions empowering the regulator to specify minimum 
quality of service, as the underlying philosophy is that the quality of service, like 
prices,  in  a  competitive  market  should  be  determined  by  the  market.    Under  the 
conditions of a licence regulating access providers, a licensee is required to provide “a 
good, efficient and continuous service in a manner satisfactory to the [TA]”
136, but 
this condition is probably too vague to form the legal basis for imposing specific 
standards on the access providers for minimum quality of service.     
 
In comparison to the legal requirements under the current Hong Kong law. the legal 
standards  in  the  US  and  Europe  for  access  providers  to  disclose  information  to 
consumers  are  much  more  specific.    In  the  US,  the  FCC  has introduced  network 
neutrality regulation in December 2010 with the aim of preserving Internet openness 
and freedom.  One of the rules concerning “transparency” requires the Internet access 
providers  to  “publicly  disclose  accurate  information  regarding  the  network 
management practices, performance, and commercial terms of its broadband Internet 
access service sufficient for consumers to make informed choices regarding use of 
such services and for content, application, service, and device providers to develop, 
market, and maintain Internet offerings”.
137 
 
In Europe, the 2009 communications reform package has not included any regulation 
on “network neutrality”, but has incorporated a number of provisions empowering the 
national  regulatory  authorities  to  ensure  transparency  and  safeguard  the  minimum 
service quality of the connections provided to end-users.  Regarding transparency, 
access providers must disclose in the contracts with consumers “conditions limiting 
access  to  and/or  use  of  services  and  applications”,  “the  minimum  service  quality 
levels offered”, “procedures to measure and shape traffic so as to avoid filling or 
overfilling a network link”, “how those procedures could impact on service quality” 
and “any restrictions on the use of terminal equipment supplied”.
138 Access providers 
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must “publish comparable, adequate and up-to-date information for end-users on the 
quality  of  their  services”.
139    Regarding  quality  of  service,  national  regulatory 
authorities  are  empowered  to  specify  and  enforce  minimum  quality  of  service  of 
public communications services.
140    
 
In  conclusion,  the  existing  laws  in  Hong  Kong  including  telecommunications 
regulation, competition law and consumer protection law, are not sufficiently capable 
of addressing problems arising from discriminatory practices if found to be market 
failures  that  justify  regulatory  intervention.    The  next  question  is  whether  new 
regulation should be introduced. 
 
6. Should New Regulation be Introduced? 
 
6.1 Theoretical Considerations 
 
Since the 1980’s, developed countries have implemented some form of “regulatory 
impact  assessment”  to  improve  their  regulatory  environment.
141    The  common 
philosophy behind such assessment is that regulation should be applied only to deal 
with “market failures” or other systemic problems where certain desirable outcomes 
in  the  public interest  cannot be  delivered  without  regulation, but even when such 
failures or problems exist, regulation should be applied only when the benefits of 
regulation outweigh its costs.
142  
 
So far, scholarly discussions on the costs and benefits of regulation are focused on the 
network neutrality regulation dealing with discriminatory practices targeting content, 
applications  and  services  delivered  over  the  Internet.    To  the  network  neutrality 
proponents,  the  principal  benefit  of  network  neutrality  regulation  is  to  safeguard 
innovation  on the Internet.  Without network neutrality regulation, the proponents 
argue, the innovation on the Internet will no longer be able to flourish as in the past.
143  
To them, the Internet should act as “dumb pipes” leaving the intelligence to the edges.  
They consider the “end-to-end” principle to be fundamental in supporting innovation 
on the Internet.
144  The “end-to-end” principle first expounded by Saltzer, Reed and 
Clark (1984) suggests that the intelligence of a communications systems should reside 
at the end-points, or at the uppermost application layer of the layered network model, 
and the functions of the transmission “pipes” or at the lower layers should be kept as 
simple as possible without discrimination.
145  Without adherence to the “end-to-end” 
principle, the proponents argue, the innovation on the Internet will no longer be able 
to flourish as in the past.
146   
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Network  neutrality  opponents  argued  that  strict  adherence  to  the  “end-to-end” 
principles may potentially restrict legitimate design of the Internet.  The Internet has 
not  been  neutral  in  its  original  design  and  subsequent  operation,  pointing  to  the 
differential treatment in the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) 
specifications
147 and  the  long-time  existence  of  service  differentiation  and  QoS 
technology in the market
148.  They cite the examples of service level agreements
149, 
virtual  private  network  services,  non-neutral  search  engines
150,  content  delivery 
networks
151,  and  the  general  acceptance  of  access  providers’  practices  in  filtering 
harmful content such as virus, worms and spams.
152  Yoo (2010) argues that these 
developing network topology and business relationships are mostly for the purposes 
of reducing costs, managing congestion and maintaining QoS rather than harming 
competitors.
153   
 
To the network neutrality opponents, network neutrality regulation may also restrict 
legitimate  network  management  practices.    Internet  resources  are  “club  goods” 
subject to congestion during periods of heavy usage.
154  It is necessary for access 
providers to manage traffic on their networks in order to maintain quality of service 
for all classes of traffic.  The Internet is now used for a wide variety of traffic, some of 
which  are  delay-sensitive  (e.g.  real-time  voice, streaming  video,  interactive  multi-
party electronic games) and some can accept a certain degree of delay (e.g. e-mail, 
file exchanges).  Giving priority to delay-sensitive traffic will improve the quality of 
service to end-users without degrading the quality of the delay-insensitive traffic to a 
noticeable or unacceptable extent.  Yoo (2006) has argued that certain bandwidth-
intensive applications might be a legitimate proxy for usage measurements as it may 
be too costly to meter usage over the broadband access.  Discrimination against or 
blockage of such applications might form part of network management practices to 
protect quality of service to other customers.
155 
 
The  potential  restrictions  on  legitimate  Internet  design  and  legitimate  network 
management practices would probably be addressed by qualifying the discrimination 
prohibited  by  “unreasonable”  and  explicitly  permitting  any  “reasonable  network 
management” practices as in the network neutrality regulation enacted by the FCC in 
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156  Ultimately it is the impact on revenue that is the true concern of network 
neutrality opponents.  To the network neutrality opponents, another cost of network 
neutrality  regulation  is  the  potential  negative  impact  on  investment  incentives  for 
network infrastructure.  They consider that allowing the access providers to charge the 
content  providers  for  delivery  will  enable  the  access  providers  to  raise  additional 
revenue to recover the investment in the networks to cope with the ever-increasing 
demand for speed and capacity.
157   
 
Network neutrality opponents regard network neutrality regulation prohibiting access 
providers from charging content providers for transmission to end-users to be a form 
of  price  regulation  that mandates  zero  price  for  content  providers  to  use  network 
resources.
158  They argue that in the absence of clear evidence that certain forms of 
pricing are detrimental to consumers, the access providers should have the freedom to 
experiment with different forms of pricing for their network resources.
159  Faulhaber 
(2007) points out that the supply of access services is, in economic terms, a “two-
sided market” in which both the end-users and the content providers may pay to cover 
the costs of the access services.  The pricing structure will evolve with market.  In his 
view, any attempt to freeze it at a particular arrangement is not justified.
160  Hemphill 
(2008) recognises that making available content to end-users requires joint innovation 
by both the access providers and the content providers.  The pricing issue is ultimately 
one of appropriation of the rent available between the access providers and content 
providers.  It is not clear what form of appropriation would have a better outcome for 
innovation.
161   It  is  therefore  an  area  that  regulators  do  not  possess  sufficient 
information to intervene.  
 
Another  cost  arises  from  potential  enforcement  errors.    Scholars  have  noted  that 
network  neutrality  regulations  are  particularly  difficult  to  enforce.    Blockage  or 
degradation that was deliberately introduced to harm competitors could be disguised 
as legitimate network management procedures or attributed to software problems.  On 
the other hand, legitimate practices could be mistaken for harmful discrimination.
162  
In the case of inadequate resources being allocated to the non-prioritised channels, it 
is difficult to tell if such resource shortage is due to genuine capacity limitations or an 
artificial restriction of resources in order to promote the other interests of the access 
provider.    FCC’s  network  neutrality  regulation  now  prohibits  only  “unreasonable 
discrimination”.
163    This  type  of  law  however  needs  detailed  guidelines  to  be 
developed by the regulatory authorities and many years of litigations to build up the 
case law that clarifies the exact boundary of the prohibition.  In the meantime, there 
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would  be  uncertainties  in  the  market.    Such  uncertainties  may  lead  to  significant 
regulatory costs in the form of delayed market entry or investment until the law is 
clarified.  
 
In  sum,  the  network  neutrality  debates  over  some  eight  years  have  built  up  a 
voluminous body of literature arguing for and against the introduction of network 
neutrality  regulation.    Unless  there  is  evidence  in  the  market  that  discriminatory 
practice has occurred or is likely to occur that would harm consumers’ interests, it 
would be quite difficult to prove that the benefits of any network neutrality regulation 
would outweigh its costs. 
  
6.2 Considerations for the Hong Kong Environment 
 
The Hong Kong regulator at this stage does not consider network neutrality regulation 
to  be  necessary.  OFTA  takes  the  view  that  the  “competitive  nature  of  the 
telecommunications  market  in  Hong  Kong  has  the  ability  to  dilute  any  negative 
impact” of violation of the principles of network neutrality, and “[i]n the unlikely 
event  that  the  market  cannot  solve  a  problem  associated  with  Network 
Neutrality,  ……  existing  regulations  at  hand  should  be  capable  of  addressing  the 
problem.”
164   
 
The author agrees with OFTA that the market in Hong Kong is working and there 
appears to be no significant problem in the market.  There were only a couple of 
incidents connected with network neutrality in the past and these incidents have been 
resolved for the time being.  The reported incident on blockage of VoIP on the Internet 
occurred  some  seven  years  ago.
165 A  more  recent  incident  about  the  “fair  use” 
restrictions of mobile operators has apparently been settled by the regulator pushing 
the  operators  to  improve  their  transparency  measures.
166    As  far  as  content, 
applications and services delivered over the Internet are concerned, the problems of 
deviations from network neutrality are largely prospective.   Although the potential 
for discriminatory practices may be greater in the provision of carriage services over 
the  managed  networks,  this  would  not  be  a  concern  if  an  open  infrastructure  is 
maintained  on the Internet.   Given the uncertainties as to whether the benefits of 
additional regulation would outweigh the costs, the justification does not exist for any 
new regulation on network neutrality at this stage.  It is prudent to monitor the market 
behaviours  for  the  time  being  and,  in  the  meantime,  other  more  proportionate 
measures may be considered.  In particular, measures to improve the transparency of 
market practices should be considered. 
 
Some  observations  on  market  practices  show  that  there  is  much  room  for 
improvements of operators’ transparency in the provision of access services to the 
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Internet.  At present, the access providers in Hong Kong are not entirely transparent 
with regard to the network management practices or their policy towards the end-
users for “excessive usage”.  The contract is either silent on the practices and policy, 
or  has  included  conditions  restricting  the  excessive  use  of  the  broadband  access 
services that are quite vague or one-sided.  One of the standard terms and conditions 
of i-Cable, the cable modem operator, reads as follows: 
 
……If we, in our sole judgement, consider that your use of our Cable Broadband 
Service  has  consumed  a  bandwidth  which  is  not  typically  associated  with 
residential use and is otherwise excessive, which may inhibit, restrict or degrade 
other subscribers’ use or enjoyment of our Services, upon the first detection of 
such usage behaviour, we will alert and warn you and allow you to rectify the 
problem.  If the usage behaviour persists, as part of our resource management 
outlined  in  [the  above  clause],  we  may  ……restrict  or  limit  the  bandwidth 
available to you to such rate for such period as we may in our absolute discretion 
consider fit and proper.
167 
 
This condition is effectively advising the customer that he/she may be punished for 
“excessive usage”, but the access provider is not telling the customer what “excessive 
usage” is at the time of contract and the meaning of “excessive usage” may well 
change over time at the sole discretion of the access provider.  This type of contract 
terms is likely to be falling short of the standards of disclosure required in the US and 
Europe.  For example, Comcast Corporation in US, after the FCC’s ruling in August 
2008, has published much more detailed and specific information on what constitutes 
“excessive  use”  and  on  its  network  management  practices.
168   In  the  published 
information, it has made some specific commitments that the network management 
technique is “protocol-agnostic” and “content neutral”, applied in “a certain area of 




Another example relates to the transparency of the “fair use” restrictions of mobile 
operators.  The Consumer Council in Hong Kong reported in March 2010 that the so-
called “unlimited use” plans of mobile operators are actually subject to “fair use” 
restrictions.  Such “fair use” clauses had always existed in the contracts between the 
operators and their customers, and were aimed to maintain quality of service for the 
majority  of  the  customers,  but  the  Consumer  Council’s  report  revealed  that  the 
operators had not been drawing customers’ attention to the existence of such clauses 
in the marketing of the services.
170 
 
All mobile operators have restrictions against “excessive” usage that would adversely 
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affect the quality of service provided to other subscribers.  However, the “Fair Use 
Policy” of CSL, one of the mobile operators characterizes the top 5% heavy users as 
“abusers”.
171   CSL  stated,  “According  to  our  statistics  only  a  small  number  of 
individuals  are  abusing  the  network.    At  the  moment  these  serious  abusers  are 
approximately  5%  of  our  customers.”
172   It  seems  that  a  user  would  become  an 
“abuser” if he or she happens to be falling within the top 5% in terms of volume of 
usage. 
 
Self-regulation by industry players may be considered as a measure to improve the 
transparency on network management practices and quality of service.  OFTA has 
engaged  the  industry  to  discuss  the  network  neutrality  problems.    As  part  of  the 
discussions,  OFTA  and  the  industry  should  jointly  establish  the  criteria  of  what 
constitutes reasonable network management.  The industry should be encouraged to 
develop a voluntary code of practice on network management practices and disclosure 
of  such  practices  to  consumers,  with  threat  of  introducing  regulation  to  mandate 
disclosure if a satisfactory code is not adopted.   
 
This  threat  would  not  be  credible  without  legal  backing.    This  paper  has  earlier 
referred to the codification by the FCC and the EC of the requirements for disclosure 
of  information  by  access  providers  to  achieve  network  neutrality  goals.
173   Hong 
Kong  should  also  consider  mandated  disclosure  of  information,  as  a  positive 
obligation under either a consumer protection law or the TO in addition to the existing 
negative obligation of not to mislead or deceive under section 7M of the TO.  Cross-
sector consumer protection law suffers from the disadvantage of being too general to 
cover specific requirements for individual sectors.  Therefore mandated disclosure of 
information  such  as  food  labelling  is  normally  specified  in  sector-specific 
legislation.
174   The  TO  or  licence  conditions  should  be  amended  to  empower  the 
regulator  to  specify  the  information  that  must  be  disclosed  to  customers  by 
telecommunications  licensees.    In  relation  to  broadband  access  services,  such 
information  should  include  the  usage  restrictions  of  broadband  access  services, 
network  management  practices  adopted  by  the  operators  and  comparable  data  of 
actual  quality  of  service  achieved.    This  power  needs  not  be  invoked  unless  the 
industry has failed to adopt and follow the voluntary code for disclosure as discussed 
in the preceding paragraph. 
 
The  information  to  be  disclosed  by  access  providers  is  necessarily  technical  and 
detailed.  Although the information is likely to be analysed by the regulator, other 
industry  players  and  technology  savvy  end-users  to  identify  any  unreasonable 
practices, such disclosure is supposed to be read by the ordinary consumers as well.  
The information would not be meaningful to ordinary consumers without enhanced 
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consumer  education.    The  industry  and  OFTA  should  work  towards  enhancing 




Competitive conditions in Hong Kong should deter access providers from engaging in 
discriminatory practices against content, applications and services on the Internet.  If 
access providers should engage in such practices, they would likely face substantial 
costs due to customer switching to other suppliers.  There is a general expectation 
among the end-users that they should be able to reach all lawful content, applications 
and  services  on  the  Internet  and  the  access  services  should  provide  adequate 
performance  to  support  this  user  requirement.    Discriminatory  practices  on  the 
Internet therefore appear to pose less serious a threat to public interests compared 
with other markets with less intense competition.   
 
The considerations related to the managed networks would be different.  In the first 
place, there is no expectation among the end-users that they can reach all content, 
applications  and  services  provided  over  the  managed  networks  and  the  accepted 
market norm is differentiation of the accessible products among the networks.  The 
incentives  of  the  end-users  to  switch  suppliers  of  access  services  in  response  to 
discriminatory practices on the managed networks may be different from the best-
effort Internet.  The potential for discriminatory practices is therefore greater on the 
managed networks than on the best-effort Internet.  However, as long as the best-
effort  Internet  performs  adequately  as  an  open  communications  infrastructure, 
discriminatory  practices  on  the  managed  networks  should  not  raise  public interest 
concerns.  When the best-effort Internet is no longer adequate to support the future 
needs of the society, the issues of discriminatory practices on the managed networks 
would become more relevant.   
 
The issues related to the managed  networks may not be so much about  “network 
neutrality”  as  the  managed  networks  are  designed  to  be  non-neutral,  there  being 
different grades of QoS provided and intelligence incorporated into the networks to 
support network-based innovations.  Nevertheless, the concerns about market failures 
on the managed networks remain similar to those expressed in the network neutrality 
debates  –  market  failures  caused  by  discriminatory  practices  within  the 
communications  infrastructure  that  may  impede  content  providers’  access  to  their 
intended end-users, and end-users’ access to content, applications and services of their 
choice.   
 
Investment in the managed networks represents an attempt by the access providers to 
capture a larger proportion of the overall value of content  provision and delivery, 
instead of just supplying a commoditized transmission product.  The business models 
for the best-effort Internet and the managed networks are fundamentally different.  
For the best-effort Internet, no contract is necessary between the content provider and 
the access provider.  For the managed networks, a commercial relationship needs to 
be established between the content provider and the access provider before the QoS 
enhancements and other resources on the managed networks can be provided to the 
content  provider.    The  access  providers  would  be  reluctant  to  apply  the  business 
model of the best-effort Internet to the managed networks.  So doing would lead to 
commoditization of the carriage services over the managed networks, defeating the ITS Asia-Pacific Regional Conference, 26 – 28 June 2011, Taipei, Taiwan   
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purpose of investing in the managed networks.  In the absence of legal obligations to 
offer non-discriminatory access, the access providers are likely to have the incentives 
to discriminate in order to maximize their revenue from providing carriage services to 
the content providers.   
 
The  actual  behaviours  of  the  access  providers  in  offering  access  to  the  managed 
networks would need to be further studied as the coverage of competing networks is 
expanded and additional access networks, particularly those based on the 4G wireless 
technologies,  are  brought  into  operation.    In  addition,  apart  from  discriminatory 
practices at the access service level, such practices may also exist at the top or upper 
levels of the communications infrastructure.  To ensure policy coherence, the disparity 
of regulatory treatment between different levels of the communications infrastructure 
cannot be disregarded.  Whether discriminatory problems at the levels other than the 
access  services  would  lead  to  market  failures,  whether  competition  law  alone  is 
adequate  to  address  these  problems,  and  whether  regulation  at  these  levels  is 
warranted are issues that need much more research and market observations.   
 
At this stage, the future relationship between the best-effort Internet and the managed 
networks is far from clear.  The two networks could co-exist for some time in the 
foreseeable future, with the best-effort Internet fulfilling adequately the functions of 
the global communications infrastructure.  Alternatively, the managed networks may 
replace, or become integrated with, the Internet to satisfy the different demands for 
bandwidth,  QoS  assurances  and  security.    When  this  materialises,  discriminatory 
practices on the managed networks may potentially obstruct the attainment of  the 
public interest  goal of having  an  open  communications infrastructure  to serve  the 
society.   
 
Before further research is conducted on these issues, it is premature to consider the 
introduction  of  regulation  to  address  potential  market  failures  on  the  managed 
networks.  The recommendable approach at this stage for the regulator is to introduce 
proportionate  measures  that  preserve  the  openness  of  the  best-effort  Internet  and 
safeguard  the  competition  between  the  content,  applications  and  services  on  the 
Internet and those on the managed networks.  This approach would postpone the need 
to consider regulatory intervention of the managed networks. 
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